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Abstract:  This thesis aims to contribute to the filling of a theoretical lacuna by asking: 
“what role do ethnic ties play in rebel groups’ efforts to lobby for state support?” 
Researchers have examined many facets of state support for armed rebel groups. Most 
literature on this topic has been dedicated to decision calculi of states choosing to support 
rebel groups. However, comparatively little has been said about the other side of this 
relationship: the demand for these goods and services by rebel groups themselves. 
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) introduce the concept of the “demand side” 
into the literature, maintaining that “rebel organizations [must] evaluate the costs and 
benefits of accepting external support.”  However, despite the fact that the role of ethnic 
ties in civil war and its internationalization have been thoroughly examined, no scholars 
have sought to explore the role of these ties in the “demand side” of the state-armed 
group relationship. I hypothesize thus that rebel groups that share an ethnic tie with the 
majority of a state’s ruling coalition and/or population are more likely to lobby them for 
support. I also maintain that said lobbying will strategically invoke shared ethnic ties and 
historical memories, framing appeals in “ethnic terms”. I find that such ethnic framing is 
more salient in lobbying diaspora and refugee populations for support than states. States 
were lobbied through other means, including the invocation of ideological frames. This 
work’s contribution and aim is to start a broader conversation on the role of the “demand 
side” in state support and framing processes in rebel diplomacy 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1: Introduction 
 What is the impact of ethnic affinity on rebel groups’ international diplomatic 
efforts?  Researchers have assessed ascriptive identities’ impact on support for rebel 
groups and rebel behavior at the domestic level, but something of a theoretical lacuna 
exists at their intersection. In this thesis, I intend to begin the filling of this gap of 
knowledge by further expanding scholarly research on the demand side of the state-armed 
group relationship. My purpose is to disaggregate other potentially relevant categories 
that could impact rebel diplomacy and isolate the effect of ethnicity in rebels’ strategic 
use of talk.  To accomplish this goal, my procedure is to examine case studies chosen 
from the Palestinian National Movement from 1967-1982, seeking to assess whether or 
not these rebels were more likely to lobby states with a shared ethnic linkage and  use 
language that invokes ethnic ties in doing so. Although these case studies yielded mixed 
results, I discovered useful insights into the demand-side framing processes at play in the 
state-armed group relationship 
In the first section, I review the extant literature on ethnic identity and its impact 
on conflict at the domestic and international level. After assessing work by Salehyan, 
Saideman, Kalyvas, and others, I find that while internationalized ethnic conflict is well-
examined, most works are framed around the supply-side. In the second section, I survey 
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the extant literature on rebel diplomacy, as it provides a clear starting point in 
assessing rebels’ demand-side behavior. I then develop, what is to the best of my 
knowledge, the first theoretical explanation of ethnic ties’ impact on rebel diplomatic 
behavior. This theory, which I entitle Strategic Ethnic Affectation  (SEA), maintains that 
rebel appeals should involve the strategic use and invocation of shared language, cultural 
symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. This follows a rational-choice 
model of politics, averring that rebels are utility maximizers who seek to present their 
own interests as convergent with those of potential patrons. Following work by Saideman 
(2002), it maintains that ethnicity is a credible, ex ante signal of shared preferences. I 
likewise maintain that rebels will lobby populations within states as a means of 
influencing states as well as directly lobbying their governments. In the third section, I 
present my research design and test my hypotheses. I hypothesize that rebel groups that 
share an ethnic tie with the majority of a state’s ruling coalition or population are more 
likely to lobby that state than others and to do so using SEA. In order to test these 
hypotheses, I conduct case studies from the Palestinian national movement in the fourth 
section of this paper. Using Kirisci (1986)’s logic of cognitive linkages, I examine the 
diplomatic efforts and rhetoric of Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) between 1967 and 1982 . I find mixed support for my hypotheses. 
Ethnic ties were shown to be salient, but other frames, like ideology, were employed 
either alongside this frame or in its stead. Likewise, I did not find an abundance of 
evidence for indirect lobbying.  In the fifth and final section, I outline opportunities for 
future research and this work’s contribution to the study of ethnic conflict and rebel 
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diplomacy. This thesis succeeds in examining the role of strategic framing processes in 
rebel diplomacy and contributing to an ongoing scholarly conversation.  
1.2: Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups 
Ethnicity matters, particularly as an organizing principle in conflict situations. A  
large body of literature has analyzed the impact of ascriptive identities on civil war and 
its internationalization (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Saideman 2002; Koga 2011, 
and others). Other works examine how identity can be a key variable in territorial 
disputes, irredentism, and on the recognition of new states (Ayoob 1995; O’Lear , Diehl, 
Frazier, and Allee 2005; Coggins 2008). These authors aver that ethnic identity is a 
significant factor in conflict. However, it is important to begin this analysis with a 
conceptualization of identity itself. Fearon and Laitin (2000) maintain that identities are 
social categories that are  distinguished by rules of membership and behavior categories. 
Yet this conceptualization may not be sufficient for the purposes of this study, as I am 
primarily concerned with the substance of ethnicity as it pertains to the outcomes of its 
invocation.  Enter Hale (2004) and Volkan (1999).  Following psychological research by 
Mead (1934),  these researchers develop the logic of identity as a means of distinguishing 
between self and others; a kind of “radar” that aids navigation through the social world 
through means of shared symbols and rituals.” .This work will apply this definition to its 
conception of ethnic groups and identity. Coser’s (1956) concept of in-group bias , 
defining oneself as a member of an ethnic group is as much a statement of belonging to a 
group as it is a statement of not belonging to others (Young 1976).  Hale (2004) 
corroborates this by stating that, like other identities, ethnicity is a means of 
distinguishing oneself from others, albeit by means of categories commonly referred to as 
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“ethnic”1.  The abundance of scholarship on the origins of ethnicities and their political 
salience has influenced scholarship on conflict. Yet some work disputes the labeling of 
conflicts as “ethnic” or posit that the term lacks empirical validity (Mueller 2000; Gilley 
2004). Indeed, Gilley maintains that “there is a strong case for severely limiting the field 
of ethnic conflict studies, if not abandoning it altogether”. However, an abundance of 
literature2 finds that ethnic cleavages and the usage of ethnic affinity as an organizing 
principle have a significant impact on conflict processes and behavior. Following this, I 
maintain that ethnicity is a form of “radar” that individuals use to rally others to support 
for a group, cause, or movement. This is apparent in the case of Northern Ireland. 
Protestant identity is reinforced through shared rituals, such as the parades of the 
“Marching Season”, symbols, such as the Union Jack, and employed as a tool for 
mobilization, both violent and nonviolent.  
1.3: Ethnicity and Conflict 
Conflict is a form of collective action, which means that ethnic conflict is a form 
of ethnically-oriented collective action, or “ethnic mobilization”. Olzak (2006) defines 
the latter term as “collective action based upon ethnic claims, protest, or intergroup 
hostility that makes reference to a group’s demands based upon one or more cultural 
markers”. Such processes were visible during the collapse of Yugoslavia. In a 1989 
speech commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo3, Slobodan 
                                                          
1 Hale cites Weber (1978) to identify these categories: “ perceptions of common descent, history, fate, 
and culture, 
which usually indicates some mix of language, physical appearance, and the 
ritual regulation of life, especially religion” 
2 Such as Carment and James 1995, 1997,  Davis and Moore, 1997, and many others 
3 A battle in which Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Empire, invoked to stir up feelings of resentment 
against Muslims in former Yugoslavia 
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Milosevic called Kosovo “the heart of Serbia”, invoking nationalist myths and stirring up 
anti-Muslim resentment ahead of  the Bosnian War (Tromp 2016).  
 A significant body of scholarship explicates the importance of such affiliations 
within intrastate wars albeit through different theoretical frameworks, such as Posen 
(1993)’s application of international relations theory and Sambanis (2006)’s discussion of  
power relations between groups within an ethnically-biased polity These conflicts are 
theorized by some as being difficult to resolve due to the “stickiness” of ethnic identities 
and their tendency to be reified by warring parties (Kaufmann 1996a, 1996b; Horowitz 
1985). Others still reject this reasoning about the role of ethnicity and take a 
constructivist approach that emphasizes the potential for identity change and ethnic 
defection to occur within conflicts (Kalyvas, 2008). This position, which Kalyvas, 
Chandra, and others maintain can indeed offer insights into the dynamics of conflict 
behavior. This work, while acknowledging that ethnic identities are fluid and that ethnic 
defection occurs, notes that certain actors-such as rebel diplomats and elites-have 
incentives to frame their identities in primordialist terms, strategically reifying them to 
aid mobilization. As Jones (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) notes, the case of Rwanda 
illustrative of this phenomenon. Indeed, the manipulation of the different social 
categories that constituted the labels “Huti” and “Tutsi” at the hands of elites within the 
ruling Rwandan akazu4 was a major contributing factor to the 1994 genocide. Oberschall 
(2000) develops another explanation of this phenomenon by examining the usage of 
strategic framing: individual the in former Yugoslavia did not perceive their neighbors of 
different ethnicities as threats until a “crisis frame” was promoted and activated. It is thus 
                                                          
4 “Little house” in Kinyarwarda: the clan-centric oligarchs that surrounded Rwandan president Juvenal 
Habyarimana 
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apparent that ethnicity can be manipulated by “ethnic entrepreneurs” and made into a 
salient organizing principle for violent actors, even in the absence of obvious racial and 
linguistic differences. 
An abundance of literature theorizes the ways in which ethnicity influences 
intrastate conflict dynamics, but what of the salience of ethnicity within international 
contexts?  Davis and Moore (1997), following work by Zinnes (1980) and Carment and 
James (1995, 1997)  maintain ethnicity is an attribute that can make certain dyads more 
conflict prone. These works find that the odds of a conflict are increased when one 
“advantaged” ethnic group receives political or economic benefits that others lack. The 
transnational dispersion of minority groups also has a significant effect on conflict 
dynamics and behavior.  Piazza and Arva (2015) find that the transnational dispersion of 
minority groups increases terrorism, playing a “pivotal role in the funding and 
functioning” of ethnic terrorist organizations. Likewise, Forsberg (2014) explores the 
transnational “contagion” of ethnic conflict and finds that transnational kin ties can result 
in ethnic warfare spilling across borders. Though these studies identify the salience of 
ethnicity as an explanatory variable, they do not entirely address the specific processes 
and mechanisms through which it becomes actionable.  
It follows that many civil wars become internationalized. Indeed, according to the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, this is one of the most common forms of war in the 
world today, with 13 internationalized intrastate conflicts occurring in 2014.  One form of 
this phenomenon is state support or intervention on behalf of an ethnic group in conflict. 
Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001) note that between the end of the 
Cold War and the publishing of their article, 44 of 74 insurgencies received state support. 
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They maintain that states will support insurgent groups for a variety of reasons, including 
a desire for regional influence, to destabilize neighboring states, spark regime change, 
further irredentist aims, and to support members of the same ethnic and religious groups. 
Such support can take a variety of form: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)’s 
External Support Dataset codes seven different types. These include troops as secondary 
warring party, access to territory, access to military or intelligence infrastructure, 
weapons, materiel/logistics, training/expertise, funding/economic support and 
intelligence material (Högbladh et. al 2011).  
Saideman (1997, 2002, 2012) and Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) 
provide  an excellent starting point for examining the salience of ethnicity in determining 
whether or not states give support to rebel groups. Saideman (2002, 2012), following 
scholarship by Mayhew (1974), examines the state-level role of ethnic politics in states in 
determining their foreign policy behavior.  He argues that states will give support to rebel 
groups outside their borders because of the ethnic affiliations of “politically relevant 
individuals”, i.e. the winning coalition5, and maintains that leaders will suffer audience 
costs if they do not credibly back up their paeans toward threatened kin abroad. Koga 
(2011) follows this logic and identifies three assumptions of the ethnic tie hypothesis: 
that “ethnic identities influence the preferences of individuals… that politicians care 
primarily about gaining or retaining office…that politicians need the support of others to 
maintain political office”.. Likewise, politicians will oppose groups with whom they 
share a history of ethnic enmity due to pressure from their constituents. Saideman’s 
(2002, 2012) quantitative tests find a statistically significant relationship between ethnic 
                                                          
5 See Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2002) 
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ties and states’ support for external groups. His results were insignificant when he 
disaggregated ethnicity into different (racial, religious) categories, but he found that the 
existence of a state near the conflict area dominated by an ethnic group’s kin significantly 
influenced the level of support an embattled group received. This suggests that more 
powerful kin will give support to nearby co-ethnics. Byman et. al (2001) suggest as 
Saideman has that domestic politics are salient in determining state support for ethnic 
rebels, but also maintain that support for members of a state’s dominant ethnic group 
abroad can be a convenient guise for expansionist actions, as in the case of Russia’s 
support for Russian-speaking insurgents in Moldova and Tajikistan6.  The previously 
substantiated logic, though aimed at explaining the behavior of states, presents the idea of 
ethnicity as a proxy for shared preferences and demonstrates its significance in 
international contexts. This thesis proposes that such decision calculi are also employed 
by rebel leaders as well.  
1.4 Ethnicity and Principal-Agent Theory 
Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham (2011) take a different approach to the 
question of state support for insurgent groups7. Instead of examining the role of domestic 
politics in this phenomenon, they posit that ethnicity can act as a “screening device” in a 
principal-agent relationship. Salehyan et. al explicitly acknowledge that this relationship 
has both as supply side (states and other patrons) and a demand side (armed groups 
seeking support).  
                                                          
6 The role of such realpolitik aims are a distinct confounding factor this work’s theory, and will be 
discussed later 
7 To conceptually define what an  “insurgent group” is, we follow Staniland (2014)’s definition: “a group of 
individuals claiming to be a collective organization that uses a name to designate itself, is made up of 
formal structures of command and control, and intends to seize political power using violence”. 
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Mainstream economics has long explored the dynamics of principal-agent 
relationships and problems in the scope of behavior within firms and markets (See Smith, 
1776; Akerlof, 1970; Laffont and Matimort, 2001; many others), but efforts to apply this 
theory within political science are comparatively limited (See Miller 2005; Raucchaus 
2009; some others). Following Raucchaus (2009)’s work on humanitarian intervention8, 
this work will apply principal-agent theory to internationalized civil conflict.  
In such a relationship, states (principals) will contract rebel groups (agents) to 
fight for them. In a principal-agent relationship, principals will, to the greatest extent 
possible, seek to avoid the costs imposed by delegating responsibility to other groups. 
Raucchaus (2009) details the types of costs that principals can face through delegation, 
i.e. moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs when insured or supported 
groups behave irresponsibly because they are guaranteed support by a third party. These 
actions occur in the absence of information after support has been assured (the 
contracting period). The other risk that principals face from delegating responsibility to 
agents is the risk of adverse selection. This occurs due to an absence of information in the 
pre-contracting phase about agents’ preferences. As Salehyan et al. (2011) note, this is 
where ethnicity is salient. States examine ethnic ties ex ante to determine preference 
similarity between themselves and potential agents, thus reducing the probability of 
adverse selection. This logic is highly important to my theory: it gives me a theoretical 
toolkit with which to analyze the state-rebel relationship from a rebel-centric perspective 
rather than a state-centric perspective9. The trend of analyzing this phenomenon from the 
                                                          
8 Raucchaus details how supported groups who are adversely selected can engage in atrocities  
9 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) provide another intellectual starting point for this in 
framing the state-rebel relationship as one of supply and demand  
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perspective of states is ubiquitous in the literature. As previously noted, Saideman, Koga, 
and others frame their studies around how ethnicity influences the domestic politics of 
states and how leaders choose which groups to support based on its influence. Though 
undoubtedly important, there is fertile intellectual ground to be broken through studying 
the other side of the coin: how ethnic ties are salient to rebel groups’ efforts to gain state 
support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Chapter Two: Rebel Diplomacy: An Ethnic Dimension? 
2.1:  What is Rebel Diplomacy? 
Sir Earnest Satow defined diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to 
the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states” (Satow 
1917).  Historically, scholarship on diplomacy focused exclusively on the usage of talk 
between states. Indeed, as Coggins (2015) notes, it has been defined as the exclusive 
province of states, and that the term “rebel diplomacy” may at first appear to be a 
contradiction in terms. However, rebel groups and other non-state actors can and do 
engage in diplomatic activity. Such activity mimics state diplomacy, as rebels seek to 
apply the norms of legitimacy afforded to state actors in the international system to 
themselves (McConnell, Moreau, and Dittmer 2012). Non-state diplomacy in general is 
theorized to be ““more functionally specific and targeted” as well as “more opportunistic 
and experimental” (Keating 1999, cited in McConnell et. al 2012)..  Rebel groups’ 
diplomacy often takes the form of efforts to lobby for support from external patrons: a 
means of engagement that is targeted, opportunistic, and likely experimental (Coggins, 
2015; Bob 2005; Jones and Mattiacci, 2015; Huang 2015: Asal, Conrad, and White 
2014).Coggins (2015) introduces the term “rebel diplomacy” to describe this tactic and 
other forms of external engagement by rebel groups. When engaged in civil conflict, 
rebel groups will often engage diplomatically with external actors to gain support and 
legitimacy for their cause. This strategic use of talk abroad is employed in addition to 
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violent tactics domestically as a tactic in civil wars. The literature on this topic is still 
nascent, but several clear assumptions can be drawn from the extant material.   
First, rebel groups dedicate time and effort to non-violent international 
engagement with state and non-state actors. Bob (2005) maintains that since external 
support is of critical importance to many groups, competition in the global marketplace 
for the material and normative goods that support provides is frequent and fierce. Rebels 
have employed a variety of different diplomatic strategies, including “Creating political 
parties, relief funds and pseudo embassies abroad”, “using media outlets and personal 
contacts to spread the insurgents’ ideology, propagandize, and inform [to] win the favor 
or neutrality of key constituencies”, and “diplomatic envoys and lobbyists [to] influence 
third party states' policies” (Coggins 2014).  Likewise, rebel groups have been prodigious 
in establishing front groups to serve as lobbyists, as Huang (Forthcoming) avers.  
Movements will both contact potential patrons directly and engage in “rebel 
public diplomacy” over social media sites like Twitter (Bob 2005; Jones and Mattiacci 
2015). Indeed, such non-violent engagement over social media was key in Libyan rebels’ 
efforts to gain international support during the 2011 effort to overthrow the Qaddafi 
regime as it gave rebels a quick and effective means of presenting their narrative, 
clarifying their aims, and framing it to appeal to an international audience (Jones and 
Mattiacci 2015)10.  
Next, such engagements are strategic and targeted at achieving specific outcomes. 
These outcomes may be normative-seeking the same privileges and legitimacy under 
                                                          
10 Jones and Mattiacci  note: “Public diplomacy allows rebels to shape foreign perceptions 
of the potential benefits of intervention by framing their own beliefs and preferences 
as commensurate with those of foreign audiences” 
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international law usually accorded to recognized states-or material, i.e. arms, training, 
and financial resources. These objectives are broadly conceived of by the CIA as efforts 
to “reduce or neutralize the government’s coercive power while strengthening the 
capabilities of the insurgency” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009).Coggins notes that “if 
the rebels convince outside states of their cause, they may provide the rebels with 
resources, training, or other wartimes support” or engage in mutually beneficial trade, 
alliance formation, or other symbiotic behavior. As Bull (1977) posits, the international 
state system is a high-status social group with strong barriers to entry. As rebel groups 
seek, through secession or the overthrow of their host state’s government, to become part 
of this group, rebel diplomatic efforts are as much attempts to gain international political 
capital and legitimacy as they are attempts to gain material benefits (Huang, 
forthcoming)11. Huang thus maintains that rebel diplomacy is, like statecraft, a form of 
“rebelcraft”, and “through it, rebel groups aim to signal to international audiences that 
they are serious political contenders for state power, can adopt state-like behavior, are 
amenable to peaceful talks, and champion causes that may have wider international 
appeal”.  
Lastly, rebels will choose communication strategies tailored to their audiences 
and frame their cases so as to increase their appeal to potential supporters. Sociological 
theory can provide further insights into this phenomenon. Actors within social 
movements such as rebel groups, according to Snow and Benford (1988) are “signifying 
agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, 
antagonists, and bystanders or observers”. Frames are interpretive modes that allow 
                                                          
11 See Fazal (2014) for further insight on rebel behavior  
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individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label" phenomena in the world (Goffman, 
1974). The framing employed by rebel groups in their efforts to gain external support is 
strategic. Benford and Snow (2000) identifies such strategic framing processes as 
“deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed” in that they are “developed and deployed to 
achieve a specific purpose-to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire 
resources, and so forth”. This work seeks to identify the means by which movements seek 
to “link their interests and interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and 
actual or prospective resource providers”. These four strategies, or frame alignment 
processes are frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame 
transformation (Snow et al 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). Frame bridging occurs when 
a group links two congruent but unconnected frames together, as when activists 
successfully mobilize support across different issue frames (Gerhards & Rucht 1992)12. 
Frame amplification is the “idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of 
existing values or beliefs” (Benford and Snow 2000). Berbier (1998) identifies an 
example of this phenomenon in efforts of white supremacist groups; such groups employ 
“ethnic affectations” to invigorate their supporters13. Frame extension is when a 
movement depicts its interests as extending beyond their primary concerns to issues that 
may be of concern to its potential constituents, and, lastly, frame transformation occurs 
when a movement “[changes] old understandings of meanings and/or [generates] new 
ones” (Benford and Snow 2000).  
                                                          
12 Leftist rebel groups linking their local struggles to broader struggles against colonialism and imperialism 
provide an example of this 
13 Such affectations are a key variable in this work 
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Within the study of rebel diplomacy, Jones and Mattiacci (2015) work to identify 
the means by which rebels engage external actors, positing that they will seek to increase 
their likelihood of gaining support through such strategic usage of framing. Rebels will 
promote specific accounts of events, such that they can show “their side of the story” and 
their host government’s purported atrocities against them (“diagnostic framing”) while 
promoting themselves as strong and worthy opponents of the regime (“prognostic 
framing”), capable of defeating their opponents: if supported (“motivational framing”).  
The extant literature on rebel diplomacy provides an excellent starting point for 
this project. However, there is substantial room for increasing this body of work’s 
theoretical depth. The extant work on this topic details the means through which rebels 
pursue diplomatic engagement, the reasons why they engage in such activities, and the 
nature of the groups that are diplomatically active. However, theories of rebel behavior14 
are common, as are discussions of the role of ethnicity in conflict behavior, such topics 
have thus far not been introduced into the scholarly conversation on rebel diplomacy. 
This work strives to accomplish both of these aims. I argue that shared ethnic ties are of 
deep salience to the efforts of rebels to gain support from external patrons such as states. 
This assertion is based on several judgments that will be substantiated in the following 
pages. 
2.2: A Theory of Ethnically-Based Rebel Diplomacy 
My first contention is that ethnic ties will play a significant role in determining to 
whom rebel groups address their diplomatic efforts. As previously evinced, rebels’ 
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diplomatic efforts are undertaken with the purpose of gaining normative and material 
goods from patrons. However unlimited rebels’ desires for support may be, the resources 
they have at their disposal to establish support-providing relationships and states’ 
willingness to supply said support are both finite Bob (2005) maintains that the level of 
“material resources, technological know-how, preexisting contacts, and organizational 
expertise” needed to engage a potential supporter varies greatly across groups, and states 
may not be willing to support certain groups at all. As Smith (1776) notes, “the workmen 
desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible”. To “get as much” rebels 
will seek to limit the transaction costs of bargaining with potential sponsors and 
maximize the likelihood that they will receive support. This is where ethnic ties become 
salient. In and of itself, an ethnic tie implies shared history, cultural memories, and 
language15. These different dimensions can make the bargaining environment more 
favorable for rebel groups seeking support from states. Shared history and culture can be 
credible, ex ante signals of common preferences. To quote de Borda (1781), a principal’s 
ideal contracting relationship with a potential agent is a “scheme only intended for honest 
men”. To assure potential patrons of their “honesty” (i.e. their credible commitment to 
the contracting relationship), rebels that share a common ethnic tie with the government 
will engage in a strategy that I will henceforth refer to as “strategic ethnic affectation” 
(SEA).  
I conceptualize SEA as the strategic use and invocation of shared language, 
cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. Some argue that at the 
domestic level, ethnic violence can result in the reification of such ascriptive identities 
                                                          
15 See Hale (2004) and Anderson (1983) 
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and that identity change is highly unlikely during periods of conflict due to the impact of 
“national memories” (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Van Evera 2001). However, as will I 
soon note, this may not actually be true across all cases, ethnic “entrepreneurs” and 
activists can enhance the salience of ethnicity as an organizing principle and drive leaders 
to take more ethnically-aligned positions (Van Evera 2001; Mueller 2000). This theory 
expands their logic, positing that rebel diplomats will seek to influence opinion at the 
international rather than domestic level. Likewise, it extends Salehyan et. al (2011)’s 
logic of ethnicity as a “screening device”:  it follows that rebel groups should target states 
whose populations or governments share a common ethnicity with them.  
  Like other strategies of rebel diplomacy, SEA employs multiple frame alignment 
processes. First, it includes the usage of frame amplification through the previously 
described strategy of ethnic entrepreneurship. Rebel groups need to present themselves as 
capable representatives of the interests of their respective ethnic group to credibly signal 
their capabilities to potential patrons, such as when Palestinian armed groups framed 
themselves as at the forefront of an “Arab Revolution” (Mishal 1986). Implicit in this is 
the assumption that leaders and populations care about the well-being of their co-ethnics.  
In addressing this assumption, I must be careful to not reify ethnic categories through 
reliance on “ethnic common sense” and “folk sociologies” (Brubaker 2002; Hirschfeld 
1996). As Brubaker notes, “Participants16, of course, regularly do represent ethnic, racial 
and national conflict in such groupist, even primordialist terms. They often cast ethnic 
groups, races or nations as the protagonists—the heroes and martyrs—of such struggles. 
But this is no warrant for analysts to do so. I must, of course, take vernacular categories 
                                                          
16 In ethnic conflict  
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and participants’ understandings seriously, for they are partly constitutive of our objects 
of study. But one should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopolitical practice as our 
categories of social analysis17”.  
 SEA can also involve frame extension. As previously mentioned, frame 
extension is when a group presents its cause “as extending beyond its primary interests to 
include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to potential adherents” 
(Benford and Snow, 2000). Such framing strategies are common in rebel diplomacy, but 
what of their specific relevance to ethnically-based appeals? Individuals have a diverse 
range of motivations for participating in war, including personal values, the potential for 
financial enrichment, and personal grievances manifested as a desire for revenge. For 
some individuals, these motivations may prove to be more salient than ethnic affiliations 
and we may witness the phenomenon of ethnic defection. Kalyvas (2008), working from 
constructivist theories of ethnicity (such as those presented by Chandra) notes that, 
contrary to the assumptions of Van Evera, Kaufmann, and others, individuals can support 
actors explicitly opposed to their own ethnic group. This logically follows the assertion 
that the framing of conflict is a conflictual process in itself (Brubaker, 2002) Citing the 
example of the Mau Mau insurgency, Kalyvas notes that thousands of members of the 
Kikuyu ethnic group supported the British colonial government against their kin through 
service in the colonial Home Guard. Anderson (2005, quoted in Kalyvas, 2008) notes 
that: “these people did not like colonialism .In taking a stand, these so-called loyalists 
were in fact motivated by more prosaic and personal concerns: by the interests of their 
families; by the need to protect their property; by their sense of social status; and by their 
                                                          
17 Emphasis mine  
19 
 
own values”. Though this is an extreme example, it makes a point of fact starkly clear: 
members of an ethnic group will not always support their kin and may in fact work 
against the efforts of rebels within it. This poses a challenge to rebel diplomats engaging 
with members of a state’s population. “Prosaic concerns” such as those that Anderson 
mentioned may drive them to stay neutral or even oppose the efforts of a rebel group, 
even if this rebel group shares a common ethnicity with them. Thus, rebel diplomats will 
engage in the “ethnic entrepreneurship” described by Mueller and Van Evera by means of 
the strategic usage of frame extension. Rebel groups will seek to make their cause seem 
as germane as possible to the ethnic affinities of their potential patrons in an effort to 
make this identity frame more salient and actionable. These affinities can be described as 
part of a sense of “we-feeling”, rooted in individuals’ senses of ethnocentrism (Sumner 
1906). Brubaker (2002)’s conceptualization of “groupness” is a similar concept: an 
“event” or process that results from the reification of ethnic categories and can result in 
the mobilization of actors around these categories. Following Brubaker’s reasoning that 
increasing levels of groupness can result from ethnic entrepreneurship and result in 
mobilization along ethnic lines, an increase in such sentiment should  thus have a positive 
effect on rebels’ efforts to win support. By accepting Kalyvas (2003)’s assertions that the 
actions of actors in civil conflict are driven by “local motives and supralocal imperatives” 
and that “actions “on the ground” often turn out to be related to local and private conflicts 
rather than the war’s driving (or “master”) cleavage”, it logically follows that rebels, 
seeking to overcome this difficulty, will work to increase the salience of the “master” 
cleavage, exploiting ethnic affiliations to win material rewards. Brubaker and Laitin 
(2000) note: “there may be positive incentives to frame such contests in ethnic terms. 
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With the increasing significance worldwide of diasporic social formations (Clifford 1994, 
Appadurai 1997), for example, both challengers and incumbents may increasingly seek 
resources from dispersed trans-border ethnic kin (Tambiah 1986, Anderson 1992)”.  
Ethnic categories are easily accessible and actionable especially when placed into 
organizational and mobilization-based contexts (Brubaker 2002). When engaging with 
potential constituents or supporters, rebels cannot address their prosaic concerns, yet they 
can amplify their feelings of ethnocentrism and link workaday issues to this frame.  
Kirisci (1986) further elucidates this process in his study of Palestinian rebel 
groups. In his study, he draws upon work by Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) and others to 
develop a theory of cognitive issue linkages. Kirisci maintains that, in bargaining 
contexts, actors will appeal to emotionally or politically charged symbols to raise the 
salience of an issue to other actors. Though he does not explicitly reference Benford and 
Snow’s theory of frame extension, his logic is almost identical, noting that a cognitive 
linkage can occur “when actors come to evaluate a new issue by establishing similarities 
between this new issue and an already recognized salient issue” (Kirisci 1986). In 
describing the efforts of Palestinian groups to mobilize support, he notes that such 
mobilization occurred among Palestinian populations, state governments, and in 
intergovernmental forums.  
Following this, I note that rebel diplomats may utilize SEA both in dialogue with 
leaders and in outreach to states’ populations. Davis and Moore (1997) maintain: “even if 
members of an ethnic group are divided by an international border, their ethnic affinity 
will serve as a conduit for the exchange of information and as a potential motivation for 
action”. Strategic ethnic affectation serves to provide a theoretical explanation for how 
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communication through said affinity functions. Following this logic, I assert that if 
members of an ethnic group are dispersed across two or more states, they will monitor the 
status and behavior of their brethren across the border”. This reflects the assertions of 
Anderson (1983), who conceived of ethnic groups as “imagined communities” whose 
members feel connected to one another despite geographic distance and, in some cases, a 
lack of shared historical experiences. Though many states within the international system 
are nation states, the members of many ethnic nations live within more than one discrete 
political entity in the international system.   
This component of the rebel-state relationship can be explicated by the domestic 
politics model presented by Saideman, Mayhew, and Koga. To reiterate their 
assumptions, politicians care about maintaining power and need the support of their 
constituents. Ethnic lobbies and minority interests are of particular importance to states’ 
conduct of foreign affairs. Though perhaps a unique case due to the relatively high 
responsiveness of its government, within the United States, lobbying by ethnic groups is 
common: “Irish Americans lobbied 19th-century presidents to endorse Irish autonomy, 
and they joined with German Americans in pressing Woodrow Wilson to keep the United 
States out of World War I” and “The Greek lobby had brief success in persuading 
Congress to impose an arms embargo on Turkey, and the Armenian lobby has made 
Armenia one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. aid” (Lindsay 2002). Even so, as 
Lindsay notes, ethnic lobbying is only employed-and employed effectively-in certain 
contexts. One such situation is one of crisis: “Ethnics whose real or symbolic ancestral 
homelands are threatened by their neighbors (think Armenia, Greece, or Israel) are also 
more likely to lobby than those who come from countries that are secure (think Norway 
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or Portugal)” (Lindsay 2002). A situation of civil war would provide just such an impetus 
for ethnic lobbying, and rebel diplomatic efforts would doubtlessly amplify this.  If, in 
such a context, politicians fail to support a group’s their kin abroad, they could suffer a 
loss of credibility and subsequent political consequences at home: audience costs (Fearon 
1994). Such costs can be severe.: or even fatal Abdullah I of Jordan was assassinated by a 
Palestinian activist over his perceived acquiescence to Israel, and his son King Hussein, 
nearly suffered the same fate (for very similar reasons) in the 1970s. 
If rebel groups directly engage with members of the state’s population and utilize 
frame amplification to “radicalize” their opinions towards the conflict they are engaged 
in, then the potential costs of not supporting the rebels increases as the state thus risks 
inflaming an already incensed segment of the population.  
To theorize this critical component of diplomatic interaction between rebels and 
populations, a return to the literature on domestic ethnic mobilization-and the behavior of 
“ethnic entrepreneurs”-can be highly useful. Olzak (1983) provides us a starting point in 
the form of her definition: “the process by which groups organize around some feature of 
ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends”. 
Jones (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) makes light of this phenomenon by using the 
case of the Rwandan genocide. Noting that Rwandan identity was “fluid enough to 
manipulate”, the genocidaires and Akazu elite were successfully able to play upon fears 
of the encroaching Tutsi RPF, “[raising] the stakes around ethnicity”. These actors 
deemed the Tutsis “cockroaches” who would “take revenge on all Hutu, regardless of 
clan or religion” making it necessary for Hutu to stand together and take up arms against 
them. The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide gives us an example-albeit horrifying-of the 
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efficacy of SEA, albeit in an offensive rather than cooperative frame. The literature on 
elite manipulation and competition can offer further insights into the nature of this 
phenomenon. Gagnon (1995) notes that, when threatened, elites will shift the focus of the 
population “by drawing selectively on traditions and mythologies and in effect 
constructing particular versions of that interest”. This “ethnification” of politics was 
practiced by elites in Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. De Figueiredo and 
Weingast (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) further explain this phenomenon through the 
case of the collapse of Yugoslavia. De Figueiredo and Weingast identify three factors that 
produced ethnic violence in this case: “leaders with a tenuous hold on power fear among 
the citizenry, and uncertainty about the true intentions of propagators of violence”. They 
argue that their second assertion was, in fact, entirely rational: “citizens are willing to 
support extreme ends when they fear for their lives, livelihoods, and families”. Frame 
extension via SEA provides a mechanism that makes this phenomenon possible.  
These domestic nationalist invocations can offer insights into the ethnically-based 
lobbying strategies of armed groups. Like Gagnon’s embattled elites, actors will 
strategically frame their causes to appeal to the “subjective security demands” of 
potential patrons (Jervis 1978). In essence, they must present their struggle and the 
threats that they face as ones shared with those whom they are lobbying. By creating and 
reinforcing affectations along the easily accessible dimensions of ethnicity, it is logical to 
assert that rebels should be able to internationally employ similar strategies to those 
employed by leaders at the domestic level of analysis.  
Actors, however, can mobilize along different lines and be driven to conflict by 
“prosaic concerns” (Kalyvas 2008). Rebels, being rational actors, will seek to maximize 
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their utility and the likelihood of their diplomatic efforts’ success. To emphasize the 
“master” ethnic cleavage, ethnic entrepreneurs will “selectively [draw] on traditions and 
myths to construct suitable and popular versions of their own interests”, “exaggerate 
threats” to legitimize political mobilization along ethnic lines by making such ascriptive 
categories more salient (DeMaio 2009).  Though not explicitly mentioned in DeMaio’s 
work, such ethnic entrepreneurship utilizes the framing strategies previously described in 
this work. As aforementioned, when Hutu elites in Rwanda fomented hatred of the 
country’s Tutsi population, they strategically employed frame bridging and frame 
amplification processes, as evidenced through their rhetoric that played upon existing 
ethnic insecurities (amplification) and linked Tutsi political and economic empowerment 
to Hutus’ political worries (bridging). Identities that are both easily malleable and easily 
accessible, like ethnic identities, are thus are the easiest to emphasize. Thus, we may see 
variation across cases of strategic ethnic affectation. 
 There is an implicit assumption in all of the following: that, from the perspective 
of the potential patron, the benefits of providing support to an ethnic rebel group must 
outweigh the costs.  Byman et. al (2001) note, states will support rebels for a number of 
reasons, ethnic or ideology affinity is not central to their decision: these “less strategic” 
categories have figured in to their decision calculi, but realpolitik aims are more central. 
Though Saideman (2002; 2012) disputes this assertion, this point is important to address: 
and not irreconcilable with the broader thesis of this analysis. If I assess that states are 
predominantly concerned with military performance and strategic goals, I must also 
accept that these goals are costly to attain and that rebel groups, especially near the start 
of their insurgencies, will lack the manpower and materiel to completely signal their 
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resolve. Likewise, it is important to recall that states are concerned with agency costs 
(Raucchaus 2009).  If I incorporate Brubaker (2002)’s reasoning into this analysis, I can 
further assert that ethnic groupness is a variable category that can be increased through 
the activities of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs. Taking these factors into account, the 
literature indicates the following important points. Rebel groups will seek to signal that 
they have similar preferences to state patrons, as, facing a dearth of resources, they will 
choose less-costly (or costless) means of signaling their preferences to risk-averse states 
Rebels will thusly employ SEA strategies to signal similar preferences to states, with this 
strategy taking the form of frame-extending ethnic entrepreneurship. States will thus 
assess that their expected agency costs are sufficiently low and that they will be able to 
accomplish their strategic aims due to rebels having similar preferences 
In international interactions, the actors involved face a lack of information about 
the motives of the other involved parties. Uncertainty of motives is a critical component 
of much of international relations theory; as Rathbun (2007) notes, “it is arguably the 
most important factor in explaining the often unique dynamics of international as 
opposed to domestic politics” and figures in different ways to the different theoretical 
approaches to the study of international relations. Following this scholarship, I can thus 
maintain that uncertainty will be of critical importance to rebel groups seeking 
transnational support. Elitzur and Gavious (2003) note that information asymmetry 
between two actors is especially important when one party is concerned about the other’s 
intentions. Hence, I should expect rational actors to attempt to resolve this asymmetry via 
signaling. SEA provides a means of accomplishing this aim. Spence (1973)’s seminal 
formulation of signaling theory utilized the labor market as an example: a candidate 
26 
 
seeking a job will signal their capabilities to an employer through obtaining educational 
qualifications. It is possible to continue this metaphor by following Bob (2005)’s concept 
of a “marketplace of rebellion”. If rebel groups are in competition for limited resources, 
the most (apparently) capable, resolved, or possessed of the most apparently convergent 
goals will be the most likely to receive support.   
Scholars studying the role of signaling in diplomacy and conflict have maintained 
that signals need to have an associated cost in to be credible and thus effective (Fearon 
1994; Fearon 1997; Morrow 1999).  These “costly signals” signal “clear and direct 
positions from an external actor that are costly to establish and maintain”; they are 
expected to be effective due to the rational expectations of the signal receiver towards the 
sender’s future actions (Thyne 2006). The body of literature that maintains the 
effectiveness of costly signals dismisses that cheap talk can be as credible of a means of 
signaling. However, another, growing body of literature has countered this assertion and 
posited that cheap talk can be an effective means of signaling. Farrell and Rabin (1996) 
conceptualize cheap talk as: ““costless, nonbinding, non-verifiable messages that may 
affect the listener’s beliefs”. Sartori (2002) posits that cheap talk can be effective if an 
agent has a reputation for being honest, i.e. if previous cheap talk directed to the principle 
has been true. Thyne (2006) finds that costless signaling by a third party has a significant 
effect on civil war onset. Using experimental methods, Tingley and Walter (2011) find 
that bluffing-while costless-can still have an impact on actors’ behavior. Given the 
aforementioned, I assess that cheap talk can serve as an effective method of signaling. 
 When written in sequential order, the steps of SEA are: 
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1) An ethnic rebel group, i.e. an armed group in conflict with a state government, 
decides to lobby for external support 
2) This group, seeking to maximize their probability of success and minimize 
their costs, chooses to lobby for support from a co-ethnic sponsor 
3) In the process of lobbying for support from this sponsor, rebel groups will 
frame their situation and their demands using language that invokes common 
ethnic ties, historical memories, and other ascriptive links 
In summary, the previously outlined theory draws upon and extrapolates 
conclusions from several established bodies of literature. First, it draws upon the 
literature pertaining to ethnic entrepreneurship. Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs will “raise 
the stakes” around ethnic categories, reifying them and turning the “political fiction” of 
the group into an actionable category for mobilization (Brubaker 2002; Walter and 
Snyder 1999). The causal mechanism for this process is through reifying, invoking, and 
evoking ethnically-coded language, events, and memories.  
Lastly, it draws upon established sociological research on framing and social 
movements. As previously evinced, rebels are “signifying agents actively engaged in the 
production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or 
observers” (Snow and Benford 1988).  
2.3: Factors influencing rebel decision making 
Despite the aforementioned, there are conditions under which all components of 
this model may not hold. Ethnic rebel groups do not exclusively use SEA18, and even the 
                                                          
18 See the example of the PLO soliciting support from The Soviet Union and China  
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presence of an ethnically similar diaspora population, state, or other patron is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for ethnically-based appeals to occur. In short, I may see a 
degree of variance in the dependent variable. What explains such variation?  
First, some rebel groups may simply not seek external support. Salehyan et. al 
(2011) state that “rebels that are quite strong relative to the government [that they are 
fighting] and can rely on domestic constituencies and local resources have less of a need 
for foreign funding and will be unwilling to give up their autonomy”. Likewise, rebels 
may fear losing their autonomy: “accepting funding from foreign patrons will often come 
with strings attached as the principal assumes some degree of control over the rebel’s 
agenda; rebels give up some control over their aims and tactics in exchange for outside 
help as sponsors are not likely to offer resources for free” (Salehyan et. al, 2011).  
I anticipate that rebel groups will seek external patronage when they require out. 
Though this statement may sound tautological, when one considers that rebel groups may 
solicit support from local networks or simply not require support due to a surfeit of 
materiel and financial resources, its logic becomes more apparent. States can provide 
qualitatively different types of support than private individuals or diasporas can: one’s 
neighbors usually do not have attack helicopters and tanks parked in their backyards. 
Rebel groups are rarely as well-armed as the governments that they oppose and may be 
significantly outnumber and outgunned: states are the actors most capable of providing 
them with the necessary materiel (Salehyan et. al 2011). Rebel groups often require 
training and intelligence support: things that state actors can provide while local networks 
and diasporas cannot. Likewise, if a group has separatist aims, recognition by states-
especially great powers-is key to the success of their statebuilding endeavors (Coggins 
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2011). Rebel diplomacy could prove to be the start of a relationship that leads to such 
recognition.  
Among groups that do seek support, SEA  may not occur. Such groups may 
employ other framing processes and diplomatic methods. One variety of non-ethnic 
appeal common among rebel groups are those that appeal to actors whom Asal et. al 
(2014) refer to as “conscience constituents” 19and whom Salehyan et. al (2011) refer to as 
a “transnational constituency”. Members of this constituency of patrons may not share a 
common ethnicity with the group, but will support them out of concern for humanitarian 
and other normative concerns. Goulka, Hansell, Wilke, and Larson (2009) note how the 
Iranian Mujahidin e-Khalq “has become increasingly adept at crafting and promoting its 
image as a democratic organization that seeks to bring down Iranian tyrants, both secular 
and religious”. By framing its appeals around the group’s democratic character, it has 
gained support from non-Persian actors in the United States and Europe. (Goulka et al 
2009). However, the authors of this paper note a pitfall that rebel groups seeking 
transnational support may encounter when seeking support: designation as a terrorist 
organization. They note: “ despite the MeK’s ongoing attempts to build political support 
from the West through a multifaceted public-relations campaign,6 it was not enough to 
prevent  the group from being designated an FTO20 by the United States as well as by the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the European Union. According to U.S. law, 
providing any type of support—political, financial, or otherwise—for an FTO is a federal 
crime”. This issue may lead some groups to seek state support or support from groups or 
individuals in countries with more lax anti-terrorism laws.  
                                                          
19 A term from McCarthy and Zald (1977) 
20 Foreign Terrorist Organization  
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Likewise, support-seeking groups may be sought out by patrons at the start rather 
than vice versa. Byman et. al (2001) maintain that state support for insurgents can be a 
form of “war by other means”; their claims are corroborated by statistical analyses by 
Saideman (2002) and Salehyan et. al (2011) that find rivalry between the government that 
a rebel group is fighting and the state that they receive support from has a strong, 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of them receiving support21.  
Despite the aforementioned, I still anticipate that ethnic rebel groups will still 
seek support from co-ethnic state patrons. The literature on rebel diplomacy details the 
salience of the demand side of the state rebel group relationship, and ethnic ties have 
already been demonstrated to be salient to supply-side processes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 In Salehyan et. al (2011): regression coefficient of .962, significant at p<.05 
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Chapter Three: Hypotheses and Methodology 
3.1: Hypotheses  
 Thus, from the previously outlined theory, I can discern that rebels are utility 
maximizing actors who will engage in strategic, ethnically-based framing processes to 
increase their likelihood of diplomatic success. As previously evinced, the ethnic balance 
of a population may have a significant impact on the bargaining behavior of rebels, as 
they might act as transnational ethnic entrepreneurs. From this, I derive these two 
hypotheses: 
H1: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's 
population are more likely to engage in diplomacy with or in that state than other states 
H2: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's 
population are more likely to lobby that state using ethnically-based language than other 
states 
  
 Alternatively, rebel groups may seek to directly lobby governments for support. 
This line of action is more accounted for in the previously described formal model than 
rebel groups engaging with the population. Indeed, it may be a more likely way for rebels 
to maximize their expected utility. Thus, I hypothesize: 
H3: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of 
a state’s government are more likely to engage in diplomacy with or in that state than 
other states 
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H4: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of 
a state’s government are more likely to lobby the state using ethnically-based language 
than other states 
 
I will accept and reject these hypotheses on the following bases: 
1) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts 
2) The  presence of strategic, ethnically-based talk 
a. i.e. talk that invokes shared ascriptive ties, identities, and/or memories  
b. to achieve specific goals  
3) The direction of said efforts 
a. Towards ethnically affiliated states 
b. Towards ethnically affiliated populations  
 
3.2 Variables  
 
Our independent variables are 
A) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s ruling coalition to a rebel group 
B) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s population to a rebel group 
Our dependent variables are: 
A) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts 
B) The usage of ethnic appeals within said efforts 
 
Huang (Forthcoming)’s operational definition of rebel diplomacy, which defines 
its occurrence “as a rebel group’s conduct of foreign affairs during civil war for the 
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purpose of advancing its military and political objectives”. To reiterate, she 
operationalizes this as when a group: 
A) “Opens a political office abroad” 
B) “Sends representatives abroad on political missions; or” 
C) “Creates a political body devoted to the conduct of foreign affairs (such as a ministry 
of 
foreign affairs)” 
 
Huang opts for this operational definition as it : “identifies rebel groups that 
demonstrate their commitment to, and investment in, conducting foreign affairs; it helps 
to distinguish them from groups that may engage in propaganda or strategic talk but 
which fall short of these clear indications of intentional diplomatic engagement”. Insofar 
as this operationalization pertains to our hypotheses, H1 and H2 can be assessed on the 
basis of all of Huang’s categories: i.e. rebel groups will be more likely to create an organ 
for foreign affairs and use said body to open political offices and/or send representatives 
to states where they share an ethnic identity with either the majority of the government 
coalition or the population.  H3 and H4 can be assessed  on a similar basis.  
I conceptually define SEA as the strategic use and invocation of shared language, 
cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. To operationalize this 
definition, it is necessary to set ex ante criteria to determine whether or not the rebels’ 
usage of talk is ethnically-based and strategic. 
A) Do rebels use language in their appeals to potential patrons that invokes common 
ascriptive ties? (e.g. “Support your Irish/Palestinian/Armenian brothers!”) 
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B) Do rebels seek to achieve specific outcomes with said appeals? (e.g. gains in 
terms of recognition, material or financial support?) 
For example, if a faction of the PLO framed their appeals as being for “the Arab 
people” or “the people of Palestine”, this would fulfill category A. Instead of speaking for 
“the third world”, Muslims, or another possible category, said group would have invoked 
an explicitly ethnic category. In order to fulfill category B, such an appeal would have to 
take place within the context of obtaining normative or material benefits. Such benefits 
are broadly conceived. Normative benefits include declarations of support, official 
recognition, and allowing for the construction of diplomatic offices (as a goal of 
furthering international recognition). Material benefits are conceived of as the provision 
of direct aid, be it military, financial, etc. 
The presence of an ethnically similar state is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for SEA’s occurrence. As Kalyvas notes, individuals of the same ethnic group may not 
always support their kinsmen’s rebellious aspirations or may be mobilized to action along 
other lines. Likewise, some rebel groups may value external engagement more than 
others. Groups may prefer to rely on local networks for support rather than open 
themselves to the agency and legitimacy costs that could potentially arise from external 
patronage (Staniland 2014;Salehyan, et. al 2011).   
As averred in the prior chapter, the effect of state interference in rebel groups 
could impact said rebels’ diplomatic behavior and rhetoric. If a rebel group is backed by a 
strong foreign patron from the outset-or created by one-it will have no need for 
diplomatic interaction for purposes of gaining support. The impact of direct involvement 
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by Arab governments in the creation and affairs of the PLO and its constituent factions is 
an example of this that will be further discussed in the case studies of this paper.  
Likewise, states can directly intervene in rebel groups, taking control of factions within 
them and playing them against each other as befits their strategic interests. Staniland 
(2014) notes how this phenomenon occurred in Kashmir when the Pakistani government 
assumed direct control over some factions within the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF) when they did not act according to their policy directives. The cases of Al-Sa’iqa 
and the Arab Liberation Front, Iraqi and Syrian proxies, respectively, indicate that said 
phenomenon occurred within the PLO.  
 I thus face a significant methodological issue: support and apparent diplomatic 
activity may be supply-side rather than demand-side driven. In some cases, the 
phenomena observed in this study will be endogenous. The following case studies will 
necessarily assess these potential confounding factors and seek to ensure to the greatest 
extent possible that the lobbying efforts I observe are demand-side driven. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
To assess the aforementioned hypotheses, I will assess the Palestinian national 
movement from 1967-198222 and see if there is evidence that supports the previously 
mentioned hypotheses. 
                                                          
22 These years were selected as they mark the year that the PLO was founded and the start of the 
Lebanese Civil War.  
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To conduct a successful analysis I must assess the overall relationship between 
our dependent variables (the presence of rebel diplomatic efforts in general and SEA in 
particular) and our independent variables (closeness in ethnic composition between a 
rebel group and a government/population).  A starting point for the development of this 
relationship can be extrapolated in the following Pearson correlations23  
Correlations 
 State Support Close Kindred 
State Support 
 
 
 
Pearson Correlation 1 .189** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 
837 837 
Close Kindred Pearson Correlation .189** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 837 852 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 GC10 STAMILSUP STAMATSUP 
Close Kindred Pearson Correlation 1 .095** .184** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .006 .000 
N 852 836 843 
State Military Support Pearson Correlation .095** 1 .289** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006  .000 
N 836 836 828 
State Material Support Pearson Correlation .184** .289** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
N 843 828 843 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
                                                          
23 Run by the author in SPSS 
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These were conducted with data from the Minorities at Risk project (Minorities at 
Risk Project 2009). Each test the relationship between nearby ethnic kin and state 
support24 for ethnic rebels.  The variable for close kindred in this dataset is coded 
ordinally, with 0 representing a complete absence of international kin, 1 representing 
“close kindred across a border which does not adjoin [a group’s]  regional base (including 
groups that have transnational kindred but not a regional base)”, 2 representing “close 
kindred in a country that adjoins its regional base”, and 3 representing  “close kindred in 
more than one country which adjoins its regional base” (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). 
These levels are conceived of by the MAR project as substantively showing an increased 
level of co-ethnic presence. This correlation shows a relationship between close kindred 
and state support, conceived of at both aggregated and disaggregated levels. On the 
aggregate level, there is a positive25, statistically significant relationship between nearby 
kin and any form of state support. When state support is disaggregated into material and 
military categories, we see similar effects for both of these variables. Material support, 
however, was more strongly correlated with nearby kin than military support. This may 
be a result of the MAR project’s wide conception of material support as any form or 
amount of financial or development aid (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Even so, state 
material and military support were significantly correlated with nearby kin.  
  Thus, with nearer and greater numbers of kin members relative to the base of a 
group, the greater likelihood that they will receive support from a state’s government as 
well as their kin. Though these two phenomena may be endogenous, SEA theory suggests 
that they share a common root in rebels’ lobbying efforts among populations. 
                                                          
24 Rather than kin support 
25 +.189 
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 Lastly, inputting the following variables into a regression can allow us to 
determine their impact on state support for insurgency: 
 
1) KINSUP (Support from kindred) 
2) GC10 (Kindred present nearby) 
3) GC11 ( Kindred groups in power) 
4) GC2 (Kindred groups present in regional base) 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .187 .043  4.347 .000 
Bordering 
Kin 
.074 .022 .146 3.414 .001 
Kin Support .234 .053 .151 4.453 .000 
Kin in power .018 .018 .038 1.001 .317 
Regional kin .054 .043 .054 1.250 .212 
a. Dependent Variable: STASUP 
 
 
 
 
These results indicate a statistically significant relationship  between nearby kin 
and kin support and state support. Though empowered kin and kin in the region were not 
significantly related to state support, kin in neighboring states and existing kin support 
proved to be significant determinants of state support.  I interpret this relationship as 
occurring due to several key reasons. First, rebel groups often face a dearth of resources, 
prompting them to seek external support. This lack is both what drives rebel groups to 
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seek support in the first place as well as a factor that limits many groups’ abilities to 
conduct diplomatic efforts far afield (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011; Jones 
and Mattiacci 2015). Next, kin in countries adjacent to the rebel group’s host state are 
likely to share common historical memories and experiences with the members of the 
group targeted for lobbying. The case of the Palestinians (which will be explored in the 
next chapter) is illustrative, with thousands of Palestinians fleeing or being expelled from 
mandate Palestine in 1948 to the adjacent states of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan (Morris, 
2011).  Palestinians living inside historic Palestine (i.e. Israel, the West Bank, and the 
Gaza Strip) and the Palestinian refugees living in neighboring states share bonds of 
religion, family, culture, and the common historical memory of the 1948 Nakba 
(“catastrophe”)26. This common historical memory between members of this group lead 
to the concept of return to historic Palestine achieving great salience, so much so that 
rebel groups founded in neighboring states, such as the Abtal al-Awda (“Heroes of the 
Return”),  incorporated it into their names and stated goals. These shared historical 
memories greatly increase the salience of ethnic linkages; i.e. the actionability of certain 
categories. Though certain scholars of ethnic politics, like Chandra, disagree that shared 
historical memories fit into the framework of ethnicity, this work takes a broader 
perspective, as these memories can shape cultural identity and become effective tools for 
grievance-based mobilization.  
 
 
                                                          
26 Khalidi and others note the importance of this event as part of the formation of Palestinian national 
identity 
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3.4: Assessing Relationships of Importance 
To assess this relationship, I will begin by assessing the role of the independent 
variable, shared ethnic identity, in relevant group-state relationships. How shall I 
determine “relevancy”? As previously evinced, my hypotheses will be tested through 
case studies of the Palestinian National Movement between 1967 and 1982. I thus need to 
develop a criterion of political relevancy for states in this period to be examined across 
our cases.  
 Lemke and Reed (2001) assess the examination of politically relevant dyads-pairs 
of states that include at least one major power-in international relations and determine 
that the analyses of these pairs does not pose threats to valid inference. For the purposes 
of this study I need not ask what states are relevant exclusively to the broader 
international system, but relevant as potential patrons of Palestinian rebel 
movements.Expanding on the traditional conceptualization of political relevance, I can 
create four categories: 
1) Major powers  
2) Arab states  
3) Muslim-majority states (Outside of the Middle East) 
4) Communist states (Other than the USSR) 
Major powers are deemed to be politically relevant as they are not only the most 
important actors in the international system, but are theoretically capable of providing 
more and better support than other state actors. Arab states are deemed relevant both 
because of their ethnic links to the Palestinian national movement but due to their 
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proximity to rebel groups’ areas of operations. The remaining two categories-Muslim-
majority states and Communist states-were selected as religious and ideological 
identifications could provide additional categories for strategic framing. Palestinian 
groups such as Fatah incorporated elements of Marxist and Islamist thought into their 
ideologies, making these categories potentially usable in diplomatic framing. As the aim 
of this work is to test the salience of ethnicity in diplomatic appeals, we need to examine 
the fact that groups may utilize other categories around which to frame their appeals.  
The sample27 of major powers consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, the 
Soviet Union, France, and China. The sample28 of Arab States is Iraq, Syria, Egypt, 
Libya, and Algeria. The sample29 of Muslim-majority states consists of Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Somalia, Turkey, and Indonesia. Our sample30 of Communist states includes East 
Germany, Romania, South Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Poland. 
In selecting these states, I assert that ethnicity, ideology, and/or religion are salient to 
the weltanschauungen31 of the states that we have selected. Though some studies (see 
Freedman 1988) conceptualize of ideology as a “flexible tool” for justifying realpolitik  
aims, others take a more holistic view, perceiving it as Hale (2004) does ethnicity: as a 
“radar” through which a state’s weltanschauung, and hence its foreign policy, is 
developed32. This point is corroborated by Nair (1997), who stipulates that the case of 
Palestine has “come to symbolize the significance of a religious identity in contemporary 
international relations”.  
                                                          
27 Selected based on permanent UN Security Council membership as a proxy for major power status 
28 Selected based on a simple random sample of Arab states that existed between 1967-1982 
29 Selected by a simple random sample of Muslim countries that existed between 1967-1982 
30 Selected based on a simple random sample of Communist states that existed between 1967-1982 
31 Ways of perceiving one or one’s state’s role in the world in the broadest sense 
32 See Dannreuther (1998) 
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In selecting 20 states, I may be unable to find systemic evidence for each of these 
cases. The nature of this selection process raises several possible outcomes.  I may be 
able to find and confirm cases of rebel diplomacy and attendant SEA processes. 
Alternately, I may be able to confirm that no lobbying occurred: or data may simply be 
missing, regardless of the historical record.  
Historical context is likewise important to acknowledge. Supply side factors of the 
era, such as US-Soviet, Sino-Soviet, and other Cold War rivalries have been shown to be 
salient in external support for rebel groups in this period, such as the Angolan Civil War. 
Likewise, the Socialist, Anti-Imperialist, and Third-Worldist elements of the PLO’s 
heterodox ideology cannot be examined outside of the context of this era’s global 
communism. These affectations make lobbying efforts directed towards Communist 
states far more likely than lobbying directed at the NATO member states listed in our 
sample.  
In the Arab world in general, and among Palestinians in particular, historical events 
that impacted the salience of Pan-Arab identity and Palestinian identity as organizing 
principles must be acknowledged. The 1962 dissolution of the United Arab Republic, the 
1967 defeat of Arab armies in the Six Day War and the 1970 death of Pan-Arab icon 
Gamal Abd El Nasser all stand as important factors.  
Having selected this sample of states, I need to determine, the largest ethnic group in 
each state’s population, the dominant ethnic group of the state’s ruling coalition, and 
whether or not a given Palestinian faction reaches out to them in each given period. 
Following the logic of King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), I assess that quantitative and 
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qualitative research share the same “logic of inference”. Thus, I will attempt to construct 
an unbiased metric of inference, parsing out separate causal factors while assessing my 
individual hypotheses.  
The spread of the mobilization of PLO support from one conceptual level to another. Source: 
Kirişci, K. (1986). The PLO and World Politics: A study of the Mobilization of Support for the 
Palestinian Cause. Burns & Oates. 
 Though Kirisci initially expected the provision of support to progress in a linear 
step function, it often occurred between levels, with higher levels (i.e. international 
institutions such as the UN and Non-Aligned Movement) causing greater support at lower 
levels (Such as from Arab or Islamic States). This behooves me to assess the role of rebel 
diplomacy in this process and find cases that show either the presence or absence of 
ethnically-based diplomatic appeals within this time period directed either at states or at 
populations within them (with the intent of using them to lobby a state’s government). 
Potentially confounding factors, such as the impact of ideology, rivalry, and the 
Palestinian diaspora will need to be analyzed and accounted for.  
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It is difficult, however, to obtain data that are sufficient for this analysis. The 
minutes of private meetings between Palestinian rebel leaders and foreign heads of state 
are unavailable. However, other methods of analysis can allow one to deduce the 
presence and efficacy of targeted, strategic ethnic appeals. This work will utilize such a 
method. 
First, following Pearlman (2011), this analysis will disaggregate the broader 
Palestinian National Movement into constituent groups for the purposes of examining the 
diplomatic behavior of these specific actors. The groups that will be assessed are Fatah 
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
These particular cases were selected using the most –similar case method. All of 
the cases were selected from the same nationalist movement, though we expect to see a 
significant degree of variation in the dependent variable (i.e. in their diplomatic 
strategies). This will allow us to control for a number of different outcomes and have a 
high degree of internal validity in our results. However, for the sake of intellectual 
honesty, it is important to note the flaws of this particular method of case selection. 
Though it has relatively high internal validity, its external validity is relatively low: 
insights gained from the study of the Palestinian national movement may not be 
generalizable to other cases. Likewise, the reasoning inherent in it is deterministic rather 
than probabilistic, which may be problematic for analysis. Even so, it is the best possible 
tool to utilize to assess our hypotheses.  
The 1967-1982 time period will be broken down into three five year periods (’67-
72, ’72-77, 77-82), allowing me to ascertain what states were lobbied in a given period 
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and if the demand-side dynamics of the state-armed group relationships surveyed 
changed over time. Next, using academic sources, the states and populations targeted for 
lobbying by each group will be identified for each of the three periods. Then, utilizing 
available documents released by these groups (Such as those listed in Kadi, 1967, and 
available online), the rhetoric of these groups can be analyzed to see if any examples of 
targeted appeals exist. The latter step is critical to this analysis, yet it also leaves open the 
most possibility for error, particularly causality error. As the first paper on the subject of 
strategic ethnic affectation, a certain degree of humility is required: this work does not 
pretend to give final answers on this topic, and its analysis will likely be flawed. 
However, given the nature of extant literature on this topic and the availability of suitable 
data, this method should still be able to provide insights into a topic not previously 
explored.  
 
3.5: Sources’ role in the method 
 . Even if one can assess the expected utility of SEA and note all the reasons that it 
should happen, one must still find examples of it occurring. However, this presents a 
critical problem: the private transcripts of diplomatic interaction between rebel groups 
and states are inaccessible for researchers, if said transcripts even exist at all. It is thus not 
possible to  directly examine the process of strategic ethnic affectation. However, 
examining public pronouncements and documents by rebel groups within the periods of 
interest, their examining targets (or rhetorical objects), and then comparing this 
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information to the known supporters of these groups within these periods will allow us to 
deduce the presence (or absence) of SEA between rebel groups and their patrons.  
Fortunately, such accounts were easily located. Works such as Kadi (1967), 
Lukacs (1984), and others contain primary sources from the representative time periods. 
Such primary sources that are included are: 
1) Founding documents of organizations (i.e. the PLO charter) 
2) Interviews given by members and leaders of organizations 
3) Public pronouncements  and documents released by members of 
leaders of these organizations (i.e. the PLO bulletin)  
There are several issues with this method of deductive analysis that must be 
addressed. First, it cannot directly discern the presence of SEA. This is of particular 
concern due to the deterministic nature of case studies’ results. Next, public 
pronouncements may not be reflective of the material aims and intentions of the group: 
their appeals to ethnic affectations may simply be lip service rather than representative of 
a deeper salience of such ties. Likewise, as previously noted, a number of exogenous 
factors can cause variance in the dependent variable. Proclamations by groups may occur 
as a result of state support rather than as a cause of them.  As Kirisci (1986) evinces, the 
fluid and dynamic processes of mobilizing support for a rebel group can often be 
endogenous and difficult to identify individually.  
 In sum, I can conceptualize this work’s chief research problem as an issue of 
separating potentially actionable issue frames from one another, identifying supply-side 
and demand-side factors, and determining which of these frames and forces were salient 
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in Palestinian groups’ rebel diplomatic efforts. Our identification of different state 
categories will allow me to rigorously separate potentially endogenous demand and 
supply-side processes and successfully assess my hypotheses.  
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Chapter Four: Cases from the Palestinian National Movement 
“Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the 
Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.”- 
The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council July 1-
17, 1968 
4.1: Introduction 
 The Palestinian National Movement is a case that is both like and unlike many 
other rebel groups. This movement is rooted in Arab resistance to the British Mandate 
and to increasing Jewish immigration to historic Palestine. Indeed, as resistance to these 
outside forces continued throughout the first half of the 20th century, a distinct Palestinian 
identity developed through and alongside them. Nascent nationalism, often framed in 
Islamic terms, could be seen in the rhetoric of leaders such as Izz al-Din al-Qassam and 
Haj Amin al-Husseini. However, it was not until the 1960s that a truly cogent Palestinian 
resistance began to coalesce, spurred by the creation of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (Kirisci 1986).  
The activities of the PLO and its constituent factions have taken place in a 
network of diplomatic interactions between Arab and non-Arab states, where ascriptive 
linkages have proven to be salient. The importance of transnational ethnic ties is 
elucidated by Fawcett (2014) and Barnett (1998), who notes that the Arab states of the 
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Middle East are “territorial states” rather than nation states, which has resulted in 
conflict over norms and identity in the international politics of the region. Indeed, the 
dynamics of support for the Palestinian cause are inseparable from regional rivalries and 
the domestic politics of Arab states. Indeed, the PLO’s creation resulted from such a 
rivalry: Egypt’s Nasser, not wanting to be perceived as weak in the face of an Iraqi 
appeal to establish a Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza, backed the 
creation of an armed organization to reclaim all of historic Palestine. This seemingly 
minor diplomatic footnote resulted in the birth of this highly influential guerilla 
organization. Though Yasser Arafat maintained that the Palestinian people “had to be 
rescued from the stranglehold of Arab tutelage, inter-party discord, and regional Arab 
policies” his Fatah faction and others never truly attained autonomy from their Arab 
neighbors (Rubin 1994). Miller (1983) corroborates this, noting that the contentious inner 
politics of Arab states and their strong influence over Palestinian groups limited the 
PLO’s autonomy. He avers: “The PLO’s dilemma is clear. Palestinian power, indeed, the 
success and survival of the movement, depends upon Arab support”.  
The supply-demand framework that Salehyan et. al (2011) provide us with gives 
us a powerful theoretical lens with which to assess this national movement. The 
previously described dimensions of state intervention and rivalry fall under the purview 
of supply-side influences.  However, the constituent factions of the PLO, as other rebel 
groups have done, weighed the costs and benefits of diplomatic engagement with actors, 
seeking to maximize their utility. Arafat plainly averred this notion in a 1969 interview: 
“After all, it is with the Saudi’s money that I buy arms from China” (Mishal 1986). One 
cannot wholly separate the influence of the supply side from the PLO’s external 
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engagement and diplomatic efforts, but it would be disingenuous to ignore the demand 
side of the equation for this reason.  
In this historical analysis, I will assess the Palestinian national movement from 
1967-1982 and see if there is evidence that supports the previously outlined theory of 
strategic ethnic affectation. I need to parse out confounding factors and find cases that 
show either the presence or absence of ethnically-based diplomatic appeals.  
4.2: Palestinian Ethnic Identity 
Ethnic affectation requires an ethnic identity. However, reaching a working 
definition of Palestinian ethnicity and its origin is both a necessary and difficult endeavor. 
The origin of Palestinian identity in particular has been a topic of lively scholarly debate. 
Al-Hout (1984) maintains a primordialist perspective on Palestinian identity, positing that 
a cogent Palestinian nationalism has existed since the time of the Canaanites. Muslih 
(1988) against this perspective, and argues that Palestinian identity is a product of two 
important developments that occurred during the First World War: the fragmentation of 
the Ottoman Empire and the fragmentation of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic ideology. 
Muslih’s assessment emphasizes that these factors lead to the development of a local 
form of nationalism, known as wataniyya.  Khalidi (1992) and Migdal and Kimmerling 
furthers this argument, noting that this particular form of nationalism developed due to 
the religious and political importance of Jerusalem.  
51 
 
This study will follow the work of Sayigh (1997) who posits that Palestinian 
identity is both deeply related to33-and distinct from34-other Arab identities.  This 
distinctiveness was emphasized by Palestinian nationalist leaders, corroborating Hale 
(2004)’s conceptualization of identity as a form of “social radar”.  Outside of providing a 
working conceptualization of Palestinian identity, this thesis must accomplish two other 
goals. First, it must also acknowledge that Pan-Arab identity and affectations could prove 
salient as a means of signaling, because-not in spite of-supply and demand side factors. 
With states like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq jockeying for “leadership” of the Arab world35, 
factions PLO often came under the sway of one or more of these polities as a tool for 
achieving their broader goals. I will need to assess the level of demand-side salience in 
this process.  
4.3: Palestinian Rebel Diplomacy  
Palestinian rebel groups were active diplomats. Indeed, Mishal (1986) notes that 
“the PLO considered engagement in diplomatic activity essential to furthering the goal of 
a Palestinian State”.  If I am to follow Huang (Forthcoming)’s operationalization, 
Palestinian groups engaged in all three forms of rebel diplomatic activity, as they opened 
offices abroad, had a department for the conduct of international affairs36 and sent 
representatives on political missions. Palestinian armed groups conducted diplomatic 
activity with Arab States in the Middle East, non-Arab states outside of the region, and 
                                                          
33 “Palestinians have moreover stressed their commonality, rather than distinctiveness, of culture with 
neighboring Arab societies, with which they share language, religion, social custom, and family ties” 
(Sayigh, 1997)  
34 “Collective memories, perceptions of common injustice, and the sense of belonging to a particular 
territory provided a basis for turning a latent collectivity into a community, and set Palestinians apart 
from other Arabs, with whom language, religion, and culture were shared” (Sayigh, 1997) 
35 See Fawcett, Barnett 
36 The Political Department 
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other armed groups. However, did these groups engage in diplomatic activity in the ways 
and for the reasons hypothesized in this work? To determine this, it is necessary to 
engage with the historical and political record of events and the context in which such 
diplomatic activities occurred, drawing several key assumptions from the extant 
literature. 
First, the relationship of the PNM’s constituent factions to Arab states was by 
their subordinate status. Rubin (1994) maintains: “the Arab states often saw the PLO as a 
useful tool to manipulate but never considered it an equal partner, never consulting it nor 
respecting its interests when setting their policy” and that “When not ignoring the PLO, 
they interfered with it”. Even so, Palestinian groups were dependent on  Arab states for 
“bases, supplies, training, money, arms, political backing, and protection against 
retaliation” (Rubin 1994). Though Palestinian groups such as Fatah sought to maximize 
their autonomy to the greatest extent possible, diplomatic relations with other states still 
occurred across a vast power differential. Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, 
“[controlled] large territories, huge economic resources, well-equipped armies, and 
populations far exceeding the total number of Palestinians” (Rubin 1994). This power 
differential, and Palestinian group’s inextricable linkages to the inner politics and 
rivalries of Arab states “crippled PLO diplomacy” (McLaurin 1989). However, these 
linkages ensured the survival the group. Demand-side incentives very likely influenced 
the PLO’s continued engagement with Arab states. Despite the severe costs to their 
autonomy, Arab governmental support gave Palestinian factions legitimacy on the “Arab 
street” and continued material benefits.  
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Next, influential individuals-rather than an organized diplomatic corps-were 
responsible for much of Palestinian groups’ rebel diplomatic activity. Leaders of groups, 
such as the PFLP’s George Habash or Fatah’s Yasser Arafat personally traveled to 
different states and lobbied on behalf of their factions: “Arafat traveled in perpetual 
motion among Arab capitals, preserving his connections and making deals” (Rubin 
1994).  
In many ways, the PLO is both like and unlike other rebel groups engaged in 
diplomacy. The PLO was active in diplomacy with state governments, but the Palestinian 
diaspora played an important role in Palestinian efforts to gain external support. As 
Byman et. al (2011) evince: 
“..diasporas are largely motivated by ethnic affinity. 
Indeed, almost inherent to the idea of a diaspora is the 
concept of homeland. Communities abroad often feel a 
genuine sympathy for the struggles of their brethren 
elsewhere. At times, they may also feel a sense of guilt that 
they are safe while those left behind are enmeshed in brutal 
and bloody conflict. Insurgent groups actively play on this 
sympathy and guilt to secure critical financial and political 
support. When such support is not forthcoming, insurgents 
sometimes resort to coercion”. 
 Byman et. al (2011) also note that diasporas have been active in securing political 
support for insurgencies. Citing the cases of the Armenian, Kurdish, and Tamil diasporas, 
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the authors note that these actors have succeeded in pressuring governments to provide 
support to the rebel groups that represent them. Governments may choose not to-or be 
unable to-block support for diasporas. In the particular case of the PNM, Arab states 
chose to continue the provision of support to Palestinian groups due to the risk of 
reprisals from Palestinians angered by a perceived lack of resolve or of acquiescence to 
Israel. These risks were born both from dramatic events such as the assassination of 
Jordanian King Abdullah I as well as the high population of Palestinian refugees 
throughout the Middle East37.  
 As the role of the PLO in outreach to Palestinian diaspora/refugee populations is 
well documented38, the role that this paper needs to play is in establishing the link 
between the processes of mobilizing support among Palestinian refugees and ensuring 
support from Arab governments. I assess that these processes would take the form of the 
ethnic entrepreneurship that Kalyvas, Van Evera, and Mueller describe, using the framing 
strategies observed by Benford and Snow.  
    
4.4: Ethnicity and Ideology 
 Though constituent parts of a national movement, Palestinian armed groups 
incorporated non-nationalistic elements into their ideological frames of reference. The 
doctrinal and ideological heterodoxy of these armed groups presents us with a research 
conundrum: what frames were most actionable and when? As these dimensions of 
                                                          
37 3,353,000 in 1977 (Kirisci 1986)  
38 See Kirisci (1986), Sayigh (1997), others 
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ideology and identity could have been strategically invoked in negotiations in lieu of 
ethnicity, it behooves me to assess their salience relative to that of SEA.  
I must first identify frames of relevance. Rubin argues that Fatah’s ideology 
evolved throughout the 1960s into an eclectic blend of “Islam [and] Marxism-Leninism 
[and also] Third World radical nationalism” (Rubin 1994). Due to this, I selected both 
Muslim states and Communist states as well as Arab states into this thesis’ criterion of 
political relevancy, allowing me to assess each of these categories’ importance to 
Palestinian rebel diplomacy.  
 
4.5: The Role of Arab Nationalism 
As Ayoob (1995) notes: “Most regimes in Africa and the Middle East do not meet 
the test of political legitimacy by a long measure because they preside over artificial 
colonial constructs that are very vulnerable to internal challenges”. The creation of the 
PLO-and the relationship between its constituent groups and Arab states-was highly 
moderated by the potential agency costs of that relationship, specifically to states’ 
sovereignty.  As previously evinced, Fawcett (2014) posits that Arab states are not 
nation-states, but rather “territorial states”39, in which a transnational ethnic group 
dominates multiple states and no one state government can legitimately claim to speak 
for the “Arabs”. In this vacuum of legitimacy, the cause of Palestine provided an 
opportunity for Arab leaders to showcase their ethnic bona fides to their populations and 
in normative competition with other states (Barnett, 1998). Palestinian groups employed 
                                                          
39 Alternatively, “national states” (Sayigh, 1997) 
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the language of Arabism in their propaganda and in engagements with Arab states, which 
played both with and against the interests of Arab leaders. 
Due to the factors that Fawcett (2014) outlined, Arabism has taken on a variety of 
forms both disparate and unified. No one individual has been able to legitimately speak 
for the entire “Arab street”, though some with pretensions to such a position, such as the 
leaders of Egypt and Syria, would perceive a vehicle for their ambitions in the factions of 
the Palestinian national movement. Indeed, to understand the successes and failures of 
these groups’ efforts at lobbying for support, it is necessary to understand the tensions 
that existed between the competing forms of Arabism.  
Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch (1973), as well as other scholars, (See Baram 1983) 
identify the different varieties of Arab nationalism: qawmiyya nationalism and wataniyya 
nationalism. The former, derived from the word qawm (nation, people) is a variety of 
ethnic nationalism that signifies an affinity to the Arab people conceived as a whole. As 
previously evinced, the latter is derived from the word watan (homeland) and representss 
a local commitment to one’s own country rather than the whole imagined community of 
the Arabs (Muslih 1988; Anderson 1982). The ethnic –based appeals of Palestinian 
groups contended with and appealed to different aspects of these nationalisms at different 
points. Necesarilly, qawmiyya was utilized when appealing to Pan-Arabist sentiments, 
and wataniyya was employed when lobbying Palestinian populations within states. 
Wataniyya , as a form of local nationalism ,is inextricably linked to the concerns 
over autonomy and sovereignty that Ayoob (1995) identifies. Arab leaders, such as King 
Hussein of Jordan, sought to combat “regionalism” (iqlimiyya), i.e. the efforts of hardline 
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Palestinian groups to appeal to qawmiyya nationalism and seek the overthrow of 
conservative, “reactionary” regimes such as Hussein’s, which were perceived as being 
opposed to the liberation of Palestine and servants of Western interests (Sayigh, 1997). I 
follow Ayoob (1995)’s logic of third-world vulnerability to build an explanation for this 
phenomenon. Although heterodox,  it both supports and is supported by my prior 
assertions. 
To defuse these leaders’ concerns and ensure the ongoing provision of support, 
the leadership of Fateh framed its cause as one that sought to create a Palestinian state 
rather than a pan-Arab polity. They accomplished this by emphasizing the distinctiveness 
of their Palestinian identity and framing their efforts in the language of wataniyya.  
However, some Palestinian groups, such as the PFLP, employed the language of 
qawmiyya and won the support of revisionist Arab states such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya. 
These states were relatively small and dissatisfied with the regional status quo, as shown 
by their long-standing unwillingness to make peace with Israel. Heraclides  (1990) found 
that  such states are more likely to intervene on behalf of or support rebel groups for 
ideational or ideological reasons. Thus, “regionalist” appeals played into their interests. 
However, this interpretation contradicts the scholarly consensus on the matter, which 
posits that the PLO’s emphasis on the “specificity” of Palestinian nationalism is rooted in 
the failures of Pan-Arabism to provide a solution to the question of Palestine. Even so, 
through the case of Palestine, one can see ethnic appeals’ fluid nature.  
Mishal (1986) notes: “ a dual Arab-Palestinian identity, a shared commitment to 
pan-Arab political unity, and exposure to both symbolic and material influences from 
different Arab regimes increased the tendency among the Palestinian organizations to 
58 
 
endow their Palestinian national aspirations with an all-Arab meaning. No Palestinian 
could afford to be accused by fellow Arabs of preferring parochial Palestinian interests 
(iqlimiyya) over broad Arab nationalist ones”. Following this logic, he avers that 
Palestinian rebel groups “searched for differing formulas to balance the demands of Arab 
nationalism and the requirements of Palestinian aspirations”. Such rhetorical shifts are 
not surprising: as  rebel groups will often alter their behavior to gain or maintain 
international recognition and support (Fazal 2013) 
The oft-uneasy balance between the aspirations of Palestinian wataniyya and Arab 
qawmiyya is most starkly reflected in the language of the 1968 Palestinian National 
Covenant. Article 8 of the covenant states that: “The phase in which the people of 
Palestine is living is that of national struggle” and utilizes the adjective watani to 
stipulate the specific, Palestinian nature of this endeavor. Article 11, however, stipulates: 
“The Palestinians will have three mottoes, national unity; national mobilization and 
liberation”, describing their unity as part of wataniyya and their mobilization in terms of 
qawmiyya. This rhetorical tension is further reflected in Articles 12-15 of the Covenant. 
The former article, in its entirety, reads: “The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab 
unity. To fulfill its role in realizing this, it must preserve, in this phase of its national 
struggle, its Palestinian personality and the constituents thereof, increase consciousness 
of its existence and resist any plan that tends to integrate or weaken it”. The rhetoric of 
this part of the Covenant affirms the tension between maintaining a commitment to the 
ideals of pan-Arabism while not presenting an overtly maximalist viewpoint that would 
alienate the PLO’s state sponsors. This is evident in the usage of the adjective watani40 to 
                                                          
40 “National” as in “wataniyya” nationalism 
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describe their struggle rather than qawmi, all while offering rhetorical overtures to Arab 
unity. Articles 13 and 14 explicitly frame the issue of Palestine in Pan-Arab terms: “The 
destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the very Arab existence, depends upon the destiny of 
the Palestine issue”, as does Article 15, which states that Palestine is part of “the great 
Arab homeland” and that it is “a national (qawmi) duty to repulse the Zionist, Imperialist 
invasion” of it. As well as a means of assuaging the fears of Arab leaders, the PLO’s 
rhetorical paeans to wataniyya were a means of addressing the fundamental paradox of 
Palestinian nationalism: as Palestinians are Arabs who share a similar culture, language, 
religion, and history to other Arabs, they could be denied the right to their own particular 
state. Emphasizing the particular, Palestinian elements of their identity and of the 
territory they sought to control was a legitimizing strategy that allowed the PLO to 
continue to function as a national movement. As will be reflected in the case studies to 
come, the balance between these forms of nationalism was not always easily maintained. 
Palestinian rebel diplomats likewise faced a unique dynamic vis a vis the 
Palestinian refugee population in neighboring Arab states. Palestinian armed groups 
depended heavily on the provision of sanctuary and support by local populations. 
Particularly in Lebanon, the greatest providers of such support to Palestinian guerillas 
were Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps on the outskirts of major cities like 
Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. This assessment of the role of ethnicity in Palestinian rebel 
diplomacy needs to take all of these factors into account.  
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4.6 The Case of Fatah 
 Yasser Arafat, a Palestinian activist who would arguably become the most 
important figure in the Palestinian history, founded the Palestinian National Liberation 
Movement, better known by the reverse acronym Fatah41, in 1959. Though dedicated to 
the reconquest of Palestine, Fatah was international from its inception: Arafat widely 
traveled, recruiting members and establishing bases abroad in Algeria, Syria, and Jordan 
in the years after the group’s founding. Ultimately, Arafat would remain chairman of the 
PLO until his death. Under his leadership Fatah became the largest and strongest faction 
within the Palestinian national movement: as well as one of the most involved in rebel 
diplomacy. 
 In 1969, Arafat became the Chairman of the PLO. Arafat’s “resistance-oriented” 
leadership “enabled the PLO to have a more effective and central role in mobilizing the 
Palestinians and in expanding its basis of support both at the local and the international 
level” (Kirisci 1986). Fatah would ultimately become-and remain- the largest faction in 
the PLO. As will be detailed, this ideologically heterodox organization was 
diplomatically active and employed multiple frames a frame alignment processes in its 
efforts to gain normative and material goods.  
4.6a: Fatah from 1967-1972 
 In 1967, Israel defeated the armies of Egypt and Syria in the Six Day War. It is 
difficult to overstate the importance of this event to the politics of the Middle East in 
general and of Palestine in particular. Palestinian political-military groups faced a 
                                                          
41 “Harakat al-Watanniya li-Tahrir Filastin” 
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watershed moment. Realizing that they could not rely on Arab armies to defeat Israel, 
Fatah’s leadership maintained relations with Arab states (while not expecting them to 
intervene), great powers, and other states. By 1969, this group had become the largest 
faction in the PLO and effectively taken the reins of the Palestinian national movement 
(Miller 1983). This allows me to draw on data from a wide range of primary and 
secondary sources.  
 In March 1970, a delegation from Fatah visited Beijing: indeed, Arafat is quoted 
as saying that the People’s Republic of China was “the biggest influence in supporting 
our revolution and supporting its perseverance”. (Harris 1977). Prior to 1967, China had 
already met with members of the PLO. In 1965, a delegation led by Ahmed Shuqairy 
arrived in Peking to “flag-waving crowds beating drums and gongs” (Cooley 1971). This 
visit resulted in Shuqairy’s signing of a pact for Chinese diplomatic, economic, and 
military support. According to  an Israeli military report released in 1967, such aid 
consisted of small arms as well as “anti-tank and anti-vehicle artillery, decontamination 
chemicals and carloads of poison gas” (Cooley 1971).  Kirisci (1986) notes how Fatah’s 
ideology and framing strategies played a key role in consolidating support China and 
other Communist states in Asia.  Visits from Arafat and other PLO officials coincided 
with the Chinese government stating that the issue of Palestinian self-determination was 
“no longer [merely] an international dispute over refugees, but [a] manifestation of the 
national liberation struggle of a distinct Palestinian people”. Arafat likewise made visits 
to North Korea and North Vietnam in the early 1970s, which resulted in the opening of 
diplomatic offices in these states and the provision of support. Israeli (in Norton and 
Greenberg 1989), notes the importance of supply-side factors in this relationship, such as 
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Sino-Soviet rivalry.  However, he does not take into account demand-side incentives, 
such as the internal conflict over ideological aims within the PLO more broadly and 
within Fatah in particular. These conflicts over doctrine, and, ultimately, the political 
aims of the group, influenced to whom they directed their appeals.  
  Fatah’s rhetoric was directed to Arab as well as non-Arab audiences. Indeed, this 
was necessary as the “core Problem” that Fatah face was winning “official Arab 
recognition” after 1967 (Mishal 1986). As previously evinced, it was necessary for Fatah 
to appeal to the maximalist aspirations of the Pan-Arab governments of Syria, Iraq, and 
Egypt, while emphasizing the local nature of their revolution so as not to alienate 
supporters who feared irredentism and to ensure that Palestinian refugee populations 
would continue to provide them with support.  In a 1968 interview with the newspaper 
Al-Muharrir,  Yasser Arafat described the Palestinian struggle for Palestine as 
“Palestinian in face, but Arab in heart”, and in a 1970 statement released from Beirut, a 
Fatah spokesman stated: “We in Fatah view Palestine in terms of [Arab] national, not 
geographic dimensions”. However, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai 
al-Aam, Fatah official Hani Al-Hassan stated: “We in the Palestinian revolution aspire to 
the day we will begin our social revolution, but it is nonsense to insist that we wage both 
[Palestinian and Arab] revolutions together, because if we do, we will lose both”.  
What was the reality of the situation? Fatah sought to achieve their “parochial” 
goal of taking control over all of Mandate Palestine before seeking Arab unity. Mishal 
(1986) notes how Arafat sought to make appeals to both Arab Nationalist ideals while 
reassuring his Arab backers of non-interference in their own governments. In a 1968 
interview with French newspaper Jeune Afrique , Arafat said: “Since we do not interfere 
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in the affairs of the Arab countries, since we have in common with them and with the 
Arab people the objective of ending the Israeli occupation, we see no reason for conflict 
between us”. As Mishal (1986) confirms, Fatah’s “cooperative” approach with Arab 
regimes was based on the assumption that “the fewer the ideological arguments over 
Arab national issues, the greater the chance to reach a workable consensus and to 
mobilize broad support from fellow Arabs”. However, such “cooperation” was 
confounded by the creation of PLO statelets, conflict with Arab leaders attempting to co-
opt the Palestinian cause, and recruitment efforts (Miller 1983).  From a perspective of 
rebel diplomacy and engagement with populations within Arab states, though, “non-
intervention” was almost an impossibility.   
 Muslim-majority states did not play a significant role in Fatah’s foreign policy in 
this period. Though none of the Muslim-majority states listed recognized Israel’s 
existence in this period, signaling at least a tacit support of the Palestinian cause,  and 
Fatah received financial support from Saudi Arabia, I did not see any evidence of 
lobbying by this group (Mishal 1986). It is unclear whether or not Fatah lobbied this 
state, or if the information is simply missing.  
 Communist states also played a role in Fatah’s diplomatic efforts. Fatah received 
support from the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the 1967 war, all Eastern European 
countries (save for Romania) ended their diplomatic relations with Israel. The 
perspectives of Warsaw Pact states evolved substantially between this year and 1972, 
changing from simply viewing the issue of Palestine as a refugee problem42 to one of 
                                                          
42 In early 1969, the USSR sponsored a peace proposal that guaranteed Palestinian refugees the right to 
return to their homes 
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national liberation. Kirisci (1986) notes two “breakthroughs” that influenced these states’ 
perceptions: Palestinian groups’ increased usage of violence on the local level and the 
increased discussion of Palestinian rights on the international level.  
Fatah first made diplomatic contact with the USSR in 1968, courtesy of Egyptian 
leader Gamal abd el-Nasser, who facilitated a meeting between Arafat and Kremlin 
officials. However, the movement’s leaders made independent trips to Moscow in the 
early 1970s, including a 1971 trip by Yasser Arafat that cemented the provision of 
training and medical aid from the Soviets (Reppert 1989). As Reppert (1989) evinces, the 
PLO was “willing to seize the initiative in their relations with the Soviets” even as 
relations between Moscow and Cairo deteriorated. In this period, as in others, Arafat and 
others in Fatah made overtures to Marxist theory and a global struggle against 
imperialism. Arafat’s framing of Zionism as an extension of global imperialism matched 
the Communist Party’s official view, that defined Zionism as "militant chauvinism, 
racism, anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism” (Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1969).  
Fatah’s political doctrine was a heterodox blend of “Islam [and] Marxism-
Leninism [and also] Third World radical nationalism” (Rubin 1994). As Brubaker and 
Laitin (1998) note, there were often incentives to frame conflicts in “grand ideological 
terms”, invoking the global struggles against capitalism and imperialism as a means of 
mobilizing resources. Thus, SEA did not (and could not) occur between PLO factions and 
the USSR, other forms of strategic framing may have likely taken place in diplomatic 
engagements 
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Another Communist state that Fatah established diplomatic contact with was 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslav documents from this period note that Arafat-traveling under the 
alias Abu Omar-traveled to Belgrade in 1969 and met with Yugoslav officials from the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia  in an attempt to secure the provision of arms 
(Batovic). Documents do not indicate that Arafat explicitly framed his appeals in 
ideological or ethnic terms, however, given the PLO’s statements on the anti-colonial and 
leftist aspects of their ideology-and the fact that they met with officials from the League 
of Communists-such framing may have likely taken place. Documents, however, do 
indicate that Arafat emphasized how the PLO was seeking to “resolve the position of the 
Palestinian people” through armed conflict rather than through negotiations or third 
parties (Batovic). Rather than signaling convergent ideological interests, Arafat appears 
to have explicitly signaled the PLO’s resolve to use costly tactics. As previously 
described, signaling capabilities and resolve is a common strategy that prospective agents 
will employ when seeking to gain the support of a principal. Further visits by PLO 
officials Husam Hattib and Abu Lottof secured the rights of Fatah to open an information 
office in Belgrade in 1971.  
Conflict between factions of the PLO within this period hampered Fatah’s 
diplomatic efforts with Yugoslavia. Internecine strife nearly caused Yugoslav officials to 
postpone a Fatah delegation’s visit in 1969 (Batovic). Other factors, such as Yugoslavia’s 
concern that too close a tie to the PLO could alienate it from more conservative Arab 
countries, served as obstacles in this period. In 1971, Batovic avers: 
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The Palestinian demand for arms supply was 
granted, but only on commercial basis, and not as a 
donation. Material help from Yugoslavia included 
purchasing military equipment through Yugoslav export 
company Yugoimport, shipping medical supplies, including 
a fully equipped mobile medical unit, medical treatment of 
wounded Palestinians in Yugoslav hospitals, education 
grants for Palestinian students in Yugoslavia. At the same 
time, contacts were established between the Yugoslav 
Unions Federation and the Jordanian Labour Federation, 
that represented the Palestinians; Yugoslav Red Cross and 
the Palestinian Red Crescent; Yugoslav and Palestinian 
Student Unions; Yugoslav information agency Tanjug and 
Palestinian News Agency Wafa, etc. 
What of Fatah efforts to reach out to populations in Arab states with the intent of 
gaining support? In the years between 1967 and 1972, Fatah was able to attract and 
manage more recruits after 1967 than other Palestinian groups, due largely in part to 
resources granted by external supporters that enhanced their political and economic 
capacity. As Mishal (1986) maintains, this group entertained support from Egypt as well 
as “solid and continuing logistical backing from the Algerians, the Chinese, and the 
Syrians”. Even while receiving support from Arab governments, Fatah presented itself as 
an alternative to these states’ inability to defeat Israel. As Miller (1983) evinces, “The 
guerillas offered Arabs and Palestinians alike a chance to regain self-respect and to create 
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the “new Arab man”.  Fatah’s position of strength after 1967, driven by Arafat’s efforts 
to unify the PLO, caused Arab states to relent and acknowledge43the legitimacy and 
strength of Palestinian resistance groups (Miller 1983). Thus, some of Fatah’s influence 
in this period is more attributable to supply-side rather than demand-side factors. 
 Fatah’s diplomatic efforts were conducted both through direct and indirect means. 
As evinced in the preceding paragraphs, Arafat and other Fatah officials made direct 
contact with states from whom they sought to receive material and diplomatic support. 
However, “indirect diplomacy” was facilitated both through Arab governments and 
through multilateral forums.  During this period, Arab states such as Egypt and Algeria 
facilitated meetings between PLO leaders and other states as well as international 
organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement and Organization of African Unity 
(Kirsici 1986).  
 1968 witnessed the occurrence of the Battle of Karameh. On March 21st, 1968, 
Israeli forces launched a cross-border raid into Jordan as retaliation for an attack on an 
Israeli school bus. They were met by a combined PLO and Jordanian force which, though 
tactically defeated, inflicted substantial casualties on the IDF contingent. This event 
proved to be a key recruiting tool. As Miller (1983) avers, Fatah “sought to exploit the 
affair to enhance its prestige and create a new mythology”. The group substantially 
exaggerated the number of Israeli casualties and played off of the name of the battle’s 
location: Karameh is also the Arabic word for “dignity” (Miller 1983).  
                                                          
43 To an extent 
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 In 1970, the PLO was expelled from Jordan during that year’s “Black 
September”. Clashes between Palestinian Fedayeen and Jordanian security forces were 
common as more and more Palestinian guerillas launched raids from inside the kingdom, 
organized their own “state within a state”, and posed a threat to Jordanian sovereignty. 
Though, as Miller (1983) notes, the debacle that this ultimately resulted in “left the 
Palestinian movement divided, embittered, and with a host of organizational problems”, I 
would be remiss to let the outcome of PLO activity in Jordan shape our assessment of the 
processes that ultimately lead up to it: and the role of rebel lobbying in said processes.  
 Palestinian groups were active in engaging in recruiting activities among the 
Palestinian refugee populations in Jordan, Lebanon and other Arab states. After the Cairo 
Accord of 1969, the constituent factions of the PLO were permitted to establish social, 
economic, and legal institutions in refugee camps. Not only did the PLO serve as 
governing force in the refugee camps, but as one that “[promoted] a collective political 
and national identity among the exiled Palestinians” (Hanafi and Long  2010). 
Maintaining and developing this collective identity through means of SEA aided Fatah’s 
efforts to recruit from Palestinian refugee populations, maintain territory, and develop 
institutions. Fatah and other PLO factions’ “state-within-a-state” in Jordan exemplifies 
this (Miller 1983).  
 Fatah’s diplomatic efforts were constrained both by Palestinian institutions and 
international institutions. After Black September, Fatah suffered from a “period of 
intense factionalism” (Miller 1983). Aside from internecine disputes, Fatah’s efforts to 
“dominate and unify” the PLO as a whole, though successful, necessary took time and 
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effort away from outside engagement.  These institutional constraints affected the content 
and quality of these diplomatic appeals. 
 The first hypothesis posits that rebel groups will be more likely to lobby states 
whose governments have a similar ethnic composition to their own. We receive mixed 
support for this hypothesis. Fatah indeed lobbied Arab states for support in this period, 
and even employed language invoking Arab identity at the time that it did so, thus 
validating H3. However, it also lobbied Communist states such as Yugoslavia and major 
powers like the Soviet Union. In these appeals, the group emphasized Leftist and third-
worldist frames of reference.  
I also received mixed support for thes econd hypothesis, which posits that rebel 
groups will engage diplomatically among ethnically similar populations. Literature 
indicates that Fatah was active in recruiting and promoting Palestinian national unity in 
refugee camps around the Middle East. However, I was unable to find systematic 
evidence of ethnic entrepreneurship occurring, thus not providing support for H4.  
4.6b: Fatah from 1972-1977 
 From 1972-1977, Fatah officials continued to pursue rebel diplomacy as a 
strategy for gaining material and normative goods. However, in this period, Fatah faced 
severe internal constraints that likely affected its diplomatic activities. After their 
expulsion from Jordan, the PLO moved their headquarters to West Beirut, Lebanon. The 
shock of the expulsion from Jordan and subsequent organizational problems were the 
subject of much of the primary and secondary sources detailing Fatah’s activity in this 
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period. It was thus difficult to find systematic evidence for the employment of SEA in 
this period.  
Fatah’s diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union continued throughout this 
period (Kirisci 1986; Sayigh 1997; Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). Sayigh details how the 
USSR offered Arafat additional arms and military training for his forces during a 1973 
visit  to the Kremlin. Such aid, however, was structured as a way to induce the PLO to 
participate in the peace process with Israel and reject its prior maximalist aims. This 
helped lead to the adoption of the Palestinian National Council’s 1974 Ten Point 
Program, which called for the creation of a “national authority” to rule "every part of 
Palestinian territory that is liberated" (Palestinian National Council, 1974).  
He visited Moscow again in the summer of 1974 and met with members of the 
Politburo in an effort to ensure the continuation of Soviet support to his forces. We can 
deduce that Arafat’s diplomatic efforts matched Coggin’s theorization of rebel diplomatic 
aims (i.e. seeking both material and normative goods): after his visit, Soviet President 
Podgorny spoke in support of establishing a Palestinian state (Kisirci 1986)  However, 
supply-side forces played a major role in this period as well that may have confounded 
Fatah’s efforts to lobby for support. Realpolitik played an important role in USSR-
Palestine relations. During this period, the Soviet Union lost influence in Egypt in the 
wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and sought to maintain relations with Palestinian 
groups as a means of retaining influence in the Middle East. Reppert, however, outlines 
that both supply and demand side factors influenced this dynamic. Ensuring superpower 
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patronage was a means of furthering the PLO’s aims towards international recognition44 
as well as material and financial support (Reppert 1989).  This corroborates Coggins’ and 
Huang’s outline of rebel diplomatic aims.   
Communist states continued to play an important role in Fatah’s foreign policy in 
this period. In 1974, all ambassadors from Warsaw Pact countries met with Arafat in 
Damascus (Kirisci 1986). Arafat likewise established ties with Romanian security 
services (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). Interestingly, Arafat had previously reached out 
to the Polish government, it only allowed the PLO to open a diplomatic office in Warsaw 
in 1976 (Kirisci 1986).  
In a statement released in January, 1973, by the Palestinian National Council, 
Fatah leaders called for the establishment of a “national democratic regime in Jordan”, 
expressing continuing hostility towards the Hashemite monarchy. In the same statement, 
the PNC calls for “the struggle of the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples” to be 
“[welded]…to the struggle of the Arab nation”. (Lukacs 1984). I can infer that language 
invoking a common Arab identity may have been used in Fatah’s diplomatic activities in 
this period.  
Fatah engaged in diplomacy with Turkey, one of the Muslim-majority states 
listed, in this period, In 1975, Farouk Kaddumi, the head of Fatah’s Political Bureau45, 
visited Ankara (Akgün, Gündoğar, and Görgülü 2014). This trip resulted in Turkey’s 
recognition of the PLO. Further diplomacy, facilitated this time by the Organization of 
                                                          
44 Likewise see Coggins (2011) for more information on the role of great powers in recognizing rebel 
groups’ claims to statehood 
45 A body constituted for the purpose of conducting foreign affairs, as per Huang 
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the Islamic Conference in 1976, lead to the opening of a PLO office in Ankara. The role 
of the OIC suggests something of the salience of religious ties, however unclear.  
 Fatah’s goals, as Kirisci notes, were aimed at bringing attention to their cause at 
the international level: Arafat’s famous 1974 “gun and olive branch” speech at the United 
Nations exemplifies this. PLO diplomatic activity in international forums such as the UN, 
NAM, and OAU somewhat confound Asal et. al (2014)’s assertion that ethnonationalist 
rebels are less likely to contend for international support as their goals are limited to 
members of a specific ethnic group. This finding corroborates Benford and Snow’s 
assertion that social movements will use frame extension to portray their aims as 
extending to issues that may be of concern to its potential patrons and audiences.  
4.6c: Fatah from 1977-1982 
 In the last period that this study examines, Fatah, as well as other PLO factions, 
faced harsh endogenous and exogenous political constraints yet continued diplomatic 
activity.  
Fatah continued to engage in diplomatic activity with the Soviet Union in this 
period. On October 29, 1978, the USSR invited a PLO delegation headed by Arafat to 
Moscow (PLO Bulletin, 1978). According to the Bulletin this delegation also included 
“Khaled al-Fahoum, Chairman of the Palestinian National congress; PLO Official 
Spokesman Abdul Muhsen Abu Maizar, Zuhair Mohsen, Head of the PLO Military 
Department; Talal Naji, Head of the PLO Cultural Department; and Faiq Warrad and 
Saleh Ra'fat, both members of the PLO Central Council”.  
 According to a report detailing the proceedings of this meeting, 
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“ 
Arafat had asked to meet in Moscow for the purpose of 
consulting with the Soviet leadership on the eve of the 
Baghdad conference. During the discussions, we adhered to 
the same well-known policy that had been coordinated with 
the friends of the socialist community regarding affairs in 
the Middle East. Evaluating the situation in the Middle 
East, we emphasized that the American-Israeli-Egyptian 
deal concluded at Camp David and the separate agreement 
on Sinai being prepared on its basis constitute a conspiracy 
at the expense of the fundamental interests of the Arab 
people. By taking this path, Egyptian President Sadat has 
thrown a noose on his neck and keeps tightening it at every 
step. He has betrayed shared Arab interests and openly 
went over to the camp of those who support Israel” (Wilson 
Center) 
 At this meeting, Soviet officials reassured the PLO leader of their commitment to 
the “progressive forces of the Arab world” (Wilson Center). Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko reassured Arafat that “the Soviet leadership and people stand by your 
side and will not abandon you until you realize your just national goals, and will offer all 
support to your just struggle against the Zionist aggressors and their allies, who only 
dream of expansion and domination at the expense of the Arab Nation” (PLO Bulletin, 
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1978).  Likewise, Arafat nevertheless made multiple references to the goals of “the Arab 
people” and framed his efforts as being representative and supportive of their interests.  
This reveals several interesting facts. It validates our claim that leaders of ethnic 
rebel groups utilizing SEA their dialogues with state leaders. Moreover, it shows that 
rebel diplomats will engage in this behavior even when lobbying governments with 
whom they do not share an ethnic linkage. More interesting yet, though, it reveals that 
ethnic affectation also occurs on the supply side of the state-armed group relationship. In 
this case, a principal (the USSR) invoked the identity of its agent (Fatah) in order to 
reaffirm its commitment to said agent’s efforts. In this context, Arafat likewise framed 
his demands in broad-based ethnic terms.  These findings confound my hypotheses on 
multiple dimensions, but reveal interesting opportunities for future research.  
Fatah’s diplomatic engagement with Arab states continued in this period. On 
December 4th, 1977, Fatah and the other factions of the PLO called for the formation of 
“a Steadfastness and Confrontation Front”.  The introductory text of this document reads:  
 
“In the name of all the factions, we ratify this unificatory 
document. In asserting the importance of the relationship of 
struggle and nationalism between Syria and the 
Palestinians. The Syrian Arab Republic and the PLO 
announce the formation of a unified front to face the 
Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its 
parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The 
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Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahirnyah and the PDRY 
(People'.s Democratic Republic of Yemen -South Yemen) 
have decided to join this front, making it the nucleus a pan-
Arab front for steadfastness and combat which will be open 
to other Arab countries to join”. 
 Fatah entertained strong relations with South Yemen during this period. These 
links appear to be both a function of  the PDRY’s Pan-Arab and Socialist ideology and 
Fatah’s exploitation of it.  In 1977, Arafat visited this state and was received in Aden as 
“Brother Arafat, the President of Palestine” (Halliday). It appears that Fatah’s anti-
imperialist and third-worldist inclinations were more salient to Yemen’s leadership in this 
time period as after his visit foreign ministry officials in Aden announced that 
“supporting the just cause of national liberation movements, suppressed by Zionist 
imperialist and racist regimes did not constitute an act of terrorism” (Halliday). In the 
wake of the Camp David Accords, however, Fatah did not engage diplomatically with 
Egypt. Rather, Arafat mocked Egypt’s prime minister, Mustafa Khalil, as “insignificant” 
(PLO Bulletin, 1979).  
Communist states remained an important part of Fatah’s diplomatic strategy: and, 
on the whole, Leftist and Third-Worldist framing strategies were highly salient in this 
period. The September, 1979 issue of the PLO Bulletin describes that year’s meeting of 
the Non-Aligned Movement and the role of Fatah’s Yasser Arafat in promoting the PLO 
therein.  
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“In the final session which lasted almost thirteen hours 
Chairman Arafat took the floor to point out the importance 
of such a resolution. Chairman Arafat referred in his speech 
to the continuous Israeli bombardments against Palestinian 
and Lebanese civilians in Southern Lebanon. He wondered 
whether the Israeli land, sea, and air shelling and 
bombardments coincide with the Camp David "peace" 
treaty. "The condemnation of the separate peace treaty 
might help to stop this hell imposed on us", Chairman 
Arafat said. 
It is noteworthy to mention that all the speakers at the Sixth 
Summit considered the Palestinian problem as a central 
world issue. All the speakers unanimously asked for en 
equitable settlement of the Palestinian problem. Anti-
Zionism was one of the main slogans at the conference and 
among the neon signs of Havana during the night you 
always read. "Contra el Sionismo46."” 
 These continued paeans to Third-Worldism reflect the fact that 
rebel groups, like other social movements, can and do employ multiple 
frames depending on context. Ethnic affectation would have confused and 
alienated many of the non-Arab representatives in attendance: framing 
                                                          
46 “Against Zionism” 
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Fatah’s struggle as part of a broader struggle against imperialism proved a 
more effective tool in this scenario.  
Despite their affectations to the decidedly Pan-Arab PDRY, Fatah had a 
preference for a “specific” solution to the issue of Palestinian statelessness, reflected in 
their rhetoric of this period. A statement from Mahmoud Abbas, then a member of the 
Palestinian Central Committee , to the Qatar News Agency reflected this: “What is 
important now is to force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and to establish 
an independent Palestinian state. Only then will the Palestinian people determine their 
relations [with Arab Countries], taking into consideration the Palestinian people’s interest 
and those of the Arab nation at same time” (Mishal 1986).  During this time period, 
Fatah leaders pushed for the idea of a Palestinian “mini-state” in the West Bank and Gaza 
rather than a more maximalist design that incorporated the whole of historic Palestine. 
This goal-designed to enable Fatah to “represent its diplomatic activity as contributing to, 
or at least not opposing, the PLO struggle for a Palestinian state in the whole of 
Palestine” without “deviating from official policy”  set by the PLO as a whole and by the 
expectations of Arab states (Mishal 1986).  Fatah engaged in public diplomacy47  to 
convey these aims and win legitimacy on the international level. Though Jones and 
Mattiacci (2015) outline how rebels use public diplomacy to gain material resources and 
encourage intervention from outside sponsors,  this usage of public diplomacy proves that 
rebels can seek normative goals as well. Fatah’s public diplomatic efforts took the form 
of radio interviews with their charismatic leader, Yasser Arafat. By this time period, 
Arafat had firmly cemented himself as the symbolic and actual head of the Palestinian 
                                                          
47 As Jones and Mattiacci (2015) detail  
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national movement: his public declarations were frequent and only served to reinforce 
this status. One such interview, with the Monte Carlo radio station, reveals details of 
Fatah’s diplomatic efforts germane to my research aims.  
Arafat employs ethnically-based language in his rhetoric. When discussing the 
Camp David accords, he avers they “[harm] not only the PLO and the Palestinian people, 
but also the whole Arab Nation” (PLO Bulletin 1978). He continues to state:  
We are now at a historic turning-point, the implication of 
which is that this Arab Nation will be or will not be; that 
this Arab Nation, which includes 150 million people, will 
impose its own will and future, or accept a new colonialism 
and containment, and a US-imperialist-Zionist hegemony 
over the Arab region48. 
 What drove these invocations? As evinced in my theory, strategic 
ethnic affectation is just so: strategic. It is targeted to specific audiences in 
the service of specific normative and material goals. Radio Monte Carlo, 
despite its Italian moniker, is an Arabic language media outlet49. Arafat, 
being a rational actor, employed a framing strategy in this exchange 
tailored to his Arab audience. Though this does not directly validate my 
hypotheses, through the inferential process described in the methodology 
section, I can infer that such language was influential in swaying Arab 
                                                          
48 Emphasis mine 
49 A link to its modern iteration: http://www.mc-doualiya.com/ 
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opinion towards Fatah: Fatah lobbied and received support from Arab 
states in this period.  
Muslim-majority states expressed broad rhetorical support for the Palestinian 
cause in this period. Arafat was able to successfully lobby the (largely Pakistani) Muslim 
World League to issue a statement against the Camp David Accords that spoke in support 
of the Palestinian right to Jerusalem (PLO Bulletin, 1978). According to the PLO Bulletin 
issued that year, “The PLO delegate to the meeting brought with him a letter and a cable 
from Arafat with regard to Jerusalem, to the Secretariat of the Islamic League”.  I 
maintain that these successes were due to the Islamic elements of Fatah’s eclectic 
weltanschauung. According to Miller (1983), “[Fatah’s] social philosophy was 
conservative and used traditional Islamic symbols to appeal to a traditional Sunni 
majority”. Nevertheless, as in previous periods, most support from the Muslim world was 
rhetorical rather than material, revealing the limits of these efforts.  
4.6d: Assessment of Results 
 Fatah’s ideological heterodoxy provided it with multiple, actionable frames that it 
employed in diplomatic activity. This merits a return to the previously listed criterion of 
politically relevant states. 
 Fatah actively lobbied two of the five major powers listed: the USSR and China. 
As none of the major powers in my random sample had an Arab/Palestinian majority 
population or an Arab ruling coalition, we find no support for any of the  hypotheses Yet 
this could be solely attributed to a demand-side ideological affiliation there is a distinct 
possibility of an interaction effect between supply side and demand side factors. For 
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example, as Byman et al. (2011) note, rebel groups often received state support out due to 
states’ rivalries. After the Yom Kippur War of 1973-and the United States’ subsequent 
military assistance to Israel, Communist states sought to strengthen their position in the 
Middle East against U.S. influence. This supply side factor may have combined with the 
known Leftist affectations of Fatah to create a strengthened state-armed group 
relationship.  
  Fatah lobbied all of the Arab states in the sample save for Egypt. What explains 
this disparity? First, it is important to recall that Nasser, via the Arab league, lead the 
efforts to create the PLO, albeit as a tool that he could manipulate to enhance his standing 
among other Arab states (Barnett 1998). Even after the PLO assumed greater autonomy 
in the late 1960s, Egypt continuously provided support to its constituent factions 
independent of any lobbying efforts on their part. Such support took the form of military 
training, intelligence sharing, and the provision of arms and financial aid (Sayigh 1997). 
However, the impetus for this activity came from the supply side, not the demand side.  
 Of the Muslim states listed, evidence suggests that Fatah only targeted Turkey for 
lobbying directly, while it indirectly lobbied Pakistan through the Muslim World League. 
In comparison to other state categories, from which Fatah sought both material and 
normative goods, Fatah seemed to only seek normative goods (in the form of legitimizing 
rhetoric) from Muslim states. This appears to be a calculation based on these states’ 
relative capacities to provide such goods. As Coggins (2011) notes, recognition by great 
powers is highly valued by  rebel groups controlling (or seeking to control) territory as it 
gives them an “in” to a high-status group of actors. Likewise, great powers, being richer 
and more militarily powerful, are more capable of providing military and financial 
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assistance. None of the Muslim states listed had a comparative or absolute advantage in 
military power or wealth, but they were more able than other states to legitimize the 
Palestinian national movement in religious terms.  
 Fatah engaged in rebel diplomatic activity with all of the Communist states listed. 
Controlling for the Arab government and population of one of these states, South Yemen, 
it is clear that a Communist government had a significant effect on whether or not Fatah 
lobbied a certain state. This effect may have been endogenous, with influences coming 
from both the supply and the demand side. It is unclear whether Communist states saw 
Fatah as a capable agent due to this group’s more out of this group’s leftist affectations or 
out of other phenomena on the supply side, such as rivalry. Indeed, the most likely 
scenario is a combination of factors. Interestingly, none of the states that Fatah lobbied 
were democratic or had highly responsive regimes, which confirms Saideman (2002; 
2012)’s assertions. 
4.7 The Case of the PFLP 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was founded after the 
Six Day War ended in December, 1967 by George Habash. A revolutionary leftist 
organization, the PFLP deigned to spread its revolutionary ideals to other states while 
engaging in armed resistance against Israel. The PFLP was born of a merger between the 
Pan-Arabist Arab Nationalist Movement and other groups such as Youth for Revenge and 
the Palestine Liberation Front (Schweitzer 2011).  Habash, along with his Arab 
nationalist comrade Hani al-Hindi, were active in organizing students in Beirut during the 
late 1950s. The ANM gained a direct link to Egypt’s Pan-Arabist president Gamal Abd 
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El Nasser in the wake of a 1954 massacre of student demonstrators: the survivors, who 
were expelled from the American University of Beirut, were offered places at Cairo 
University under a special order from Nasser himself (Cobban 1984). By 1967, the ANM 
had already established itself as an international force. As Cobban notes, they had 
acquired members in both the Levant and Arabian Peninsula, particularly in South 
Yemen, where the ANM participated in the fight for independence from Britain. 
Considered to be Fatah’s chief rival in the period surveyed, the PFLP nevertheless 
suffered from internal ideological debates, more than one of which lead to groups of 
fighters breaking away to form their own factions50.  
This thesis’ period of study begins with the PFLP’s founding, which occurred in 
the context of structural and ideological changes within the ANM. The group had begun 
to develop a notable “socialist temper” (Cobban 1984). Likewise, efforts to outbid the 
already popular Fatah movement had lead it to adopt increasingly violent tactics. 
The PFLP is noteworthy for bringing the Palestinian cause to worldwide attention 
through attacking international targets they deemed part of the US-lead “imperialistic 
world”:  airliners, banks, and businesses were all targeted (Schweitzer 2011). How did 
this tactically innovative group, however, conduct diplomacy? And what role, if any, did 
ethnicity and nationalism play in their efforts? 
 In addition to reaching out to states and populations for support, the PFLP was 
active in making connections with other leftist and nationalist revolutionary movements, 
including the Italian Red Brigades, the Basque ETA, and the Irish Republican Army 
                                                          
50 A notable case of this way Nayif Hawatmeh’s 1969 split to form the Democratic Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine 
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(Schweitzer). These linkages also facilitated the recruitment of non-Arab individuals, 
such as Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as “Carlos the Jackal”, which perhaps 
indicates a higher level of salience for ideology than for ethnicity. Likewise, time spent 
lobbying other groups was time not spent lobbying states or populations in accordance 
with my hypotheses.  
4.7a: The PFLP from 1967-1972 
 On December 11th, 1967, the PFLP released their founding document, which 
declared: “The struggle of the Palestinian masses in the occupied territories is an integral 
part of…the Arab revolution against world imperialism and its collaborating forces”. As 
can be seen in this statement, the PFLP employed a heterodox mixture of Arab nationalist 
and third-worldist rhetoric in their diplomatic appeals in this period as they lobbied both 
Arab and non-Arab states.  
“The Political, Organizational, and Military Report of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine”, a series of documents released in 1969, provide a useful 
introduction to the aims and ideology of the PFLP. The first section, the eponymous 
Political Report, names whom the PFLP considers to be their enemies. In addition to 
naming Israel, the Zionist movement, and “world imperialism” as their enemies, the 
PFLP targets “Arab Reaction represented in Feudalism and Capitalism” (Kadi 1969). The 
authors of the Report state that “merchants, bankers, feudal lords, big landowners, kings, 
princes, and sheikhs” are part of a “force which objectively sides with the enemy”. 
Though these actors are Arab, the Report continues to state that these “reactionary” 
forces are “the camp of the enemy which the Arabs are objectively facing in their war for 
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the liberation of Palestine”. The Report thus provides an introduction to the tension and 
interaction between ethnicity and ideology in the PFLP’s doctrine. 
Great Powers both acted on and were diplomatically acted upon by the PFLP.  In 
the wake of Black September, the Soviet Union sought to contain the crisis to the greatest 
extent possible. As Dannreuther (1998) evinces, the USSR “in no way wanted the 
Jordanian monarch to be replaced by a radical Palestinian leadership, including the pro-
Chinese George Habash of the PFLP”. The late 1960s represented the PFLP’s “Chinese 
Phase” (Sayigh 1997). He notes that this group “emblazoned [its newsletter’s cover] with 
Mao Zedong’s portrait or other Chinese motifs, while PFLP literature contained 
numerous references to Mao, as well as to Lenin” (Sayigh 1997). 
Supply-side forces  also played a key role in determining whom the PFLP 
targeted for lobbying, particularly the Chinese-Soviet rivalry. Even so, Habash visited the 
Soviet Union in late 1972, albeit as part of a PLO delegation with Yasser Arafat (Reppert 
1989) In 1970, George Habash visited the People’s Republic of China. However, he 
received a cooler reception than Arafat and other Fatah leaders. Chinese leaders harbored 
reservations about the more radical Palestinian factions and the potential strategic risks of 
providing unconditional support to them, criticizing Habash’s faction for “wrong tactics” 
(Kirisci 1986). This reflect’s Raucchaus (2009)’s assertion that risk-averse principals will 
attempt to chastise and constrain agents who they feel will ultimately act against their 
long-term policy aims.  Habash also visited North Korea in 1970, though little 
information exists on the nature of his visit or his activities there.  
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Muslim-majority states did not play a significant role in the PFLP’s foreign policy 
in this or any other period surveyed. While Fatah maintained a conservative religious 
philosophy, the PFLP was avowedly secular, leftist, and Pan-Arabist. As much as 
legitimization in the eyes of the world’s Muslim population mattered to Arafat’s faction, 
legitimization to other leftist groups and Communist states mattered to the PFLP.  
The PFLP made explicit appeals to the broader Arab world, took advantage of a 
perceived zeitgeist: “The hopes and anticipation of the Arab masses have reached a 
qualitatively new level from before the fifth of June”. To Mishal (1986), this represented 
the fact that “the PFLP…subordinated the daily struggle over Palestine to the social and 
political of the whole Arab world”; that they took “The Arab Revolution Approach” . 
This is apparent in the ethnically-based appeals they made to the “People of the Arab 
nation”. The PFLP also emphasized the dialectic of class struggle and proletarian 
internationalism in their official documents and rhetoric. Their international leftist 
ideology played as much as-if not a more significant role-than their ethnic nationalism. 
This is evident when one examines the regimes that they considered to be “agents of 
imperialism” as well as “enemies of the Arab people” (Mishal 1986).  The PFLP derided 
such “reactionary” regimes as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt and Syria. South 
Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya, however, were deemed acceptable ideological allies, 
and thus worthy principals. Their ideology lead them to consider other Communist 
countries and rebel groups allies and potential patrons as natural allies and providers of 
support, particularly China (Sayigh 1997).  
 The PFLP suffered political constraints in this period due to intra-group 
ideological conflict. In 1968, Nayef Hawatmeh, one of the original founders of the PFLP, 
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broke away from the faction to form his own, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP). Hawatmeh favored a stronger alliance with the Soviet Union and a 
more staunch ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism in opposition to the PFLP’s 
perceived Petty-Bourgeois tendencies (Miller 1983). In the same year, Ahmed Jibril, 
another PFLP leader, broke away to form the PFLP-GC (General Command), which 
favored an explicitly pro-Syrian position.  Likewise, the PFLP boycotted the PLO’s 
central leadership in this period out of protest for not being granted a high enough 
proportion of seats in the Palestinian National Council (Sayigh 1997). These internal 
constraints lead the PFLP to undertake more unilateral diplomatic activities all while 
limiting its overall ability to be an effective political-military group.  
4.7: The PFLP from 1972-1977 
 Historical events in the period from 1972-1977 confounded the PFLP’s 
diplomacy.  In 1974, the PFLP withdrew from the PLO’s executive committee in 
response to the Ten Point program forwarded by Fatah and the PLO’s “mainstream”. 
Likewise, at the end of this time period, the PFLP became embroiled in the Lebanese 
Civil War. While at the start of the war Fatah attempted to remain neutral and mediate 
between the different Lebanese sects, the PFLP saw this conflict as “a rightist, imperialist 
conspiracy to destroy “the Palestinian and Lebanese revolutions” (Miller 1983).  Habash 
saw Arafat’s more moderate position as inviting defeat at the hands of Lebanese 
Maronite Christians and their Syrian allies.  Ultimately, Syria did intervene in Lebanon in 
1976 and struck hard against the PFLP as well as other PLO factions51. Likewise, 
Habash’s room to politically maneuver was severely reduced by the intra-PLO fallout 
                                                          
51 Save for al-Saiqa, a pro-Syrian Ba’athist faction  
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that resulted from Egypt’s 1977 peace accords with Israel. Arafat attempted to avoid a 
complete break with the Egyptian government, which resulted in the PFLP, DFLP and 
other factions distancing themselves from him politically. As with my case study of 
Fatah, clear evidence of SEA was difficult to come by in this period. Even so, I deduced 
SEA’s presence and found clear evidence of non-ethnic framing as well.  
Without support from other PLO organizations, the PFLP thus faced a severe 
internal constraint on its diplomatic activity. Likewise, the Lebanon imbroglio imposed 
severe costs on it the organization both in terms of wealth and manpower. Perhaps due to 
these costs, rebel diplomacy was not a significant part of the PFLP’s strategy in this 
period Even so, it entertained close relations with the Soviet Union , Iraq, and Libya 
throughout the 1970s.  The USSR provided financial support, weapons52 training to PFLP 
operatives and underwrote some of their largest operations, such as the 1975 raid on the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna (Andrew and 
Mitrokhin 2005). The leader of their armed wing, Wadie Haddad, was the key to this 
relationship. However, rebel diplomatic efforts were not directly responsible for this: the 
KGB recruited Haddad in 1970 as an asset (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005). Instead, as 
Saideman (2002) and Salehyan (2011) theorized, this is an example of a patron seeking 
out a rebel group rather than vice versa. Among Arab states, Sayigh (1997) avers that 
despite Iraqi-Libyan financial support, “the combination of [the PFLP’s] internal 
instability and Iraqi-Libyan backing encouraged further rhetorical militancy”, implying 
that patronage from external states-a supply side factor-affected the rhetoric of the group 
rather than vice versa.  
                                                          
52 Small arms, rocket propelled grenades, mines and other explosives, and ammunition 
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 This process is a product of two endogenous factors: its fractured internal politics 
and its penetration by external state actors. As Pearlman (2011) notes:  
“Though any non-state actor is vulnerable to interference, 
the more cohesive it is, the more impenetrable its internal 
decision-making processes and political-strategic position 
will be. The more fragmented, the more outside actors will 
be able to manipulate persons or factions within the 
movement to act as their proxies”.  
This phenomenon is evident through the KGB’s recruiting of Wadie Haddad and 
the USSR’s underwriting of PFLP operations. The PFLP’s internal politics in this period 
helped bring about this state of affairs.  In summary, though ethnic and ideology-based 
lobbying occurred in this time period, it is unclear to what extent demand-side diplomatic 
forces drove this rhetoric.  
4.7c: The PFLP from 1977-1982 
 The PFLP remained outside of the PLO until 1981. As Sayigh (1997) notes, this 
decision was a serious miscalculation that ultimately lead to the strengthening and 
legitimization of the PLO mainstream and the weakening of the PFLP and other 
rejectionist groups.  
 While their break from the PLO isolated them from this group’s diplomatic access 
to states, the PFLP cooperated with other armed groups during this time period. In 1977, 
operatives from this group cooperated with the German Red Army Faction in an airliner 
hijacking. Despite its official boycott, the PFLP joined the other factions of the PLO to 
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sign the Six-Point Program announcing the creation of a “Steadfastness and Rejection 
Front”.  
Like other  documents released by the PLO, it was the result of much internecine debate 
and compromise over rhetoric. Even despite the institutional constraints that it faced, the 
PFLP managed to benefit  from this diplomatic act. First, the PFLP’s “Arab revolution” 
approach was officially endorsed in  the document’s 10th article: 
 
“The conference pledges to the Arab nation that it will continue the  
march of struggle, steadfastness, combat and adherence to the  
objectives of the Arab struggle53. The conference also expresses its  
deep faith and absolute confidence that the Arab nation, which has  
staged revolutions, overcome difficulties and defeated plots during  
its long history of struggle-a struggle which abounds with heroism  
is today capable of replying with force to those who have harmed  
its dignity, squandered its rights, split its solidarity and departed  
from the principles of its struggle. It is confident of its own  
capabilities in liberation, progress and victory, thanks to God. 
 
                                                          
53 Emphasis mine 
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The document also secured the cooperation of radical Arab states who historically  
cooperated with the PFLP, such as South Yemen, Libya, and Algeria. Article six states:  
 
“In asserting the importance of the relationship of struggle and  
nationalism54 between Syria and the Palestinians. The Syrian Arab  
Republic and the PLO announce the formation of a unified front to  
face the Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its  
parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The Democratic  
and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist People's Libyan  
Arab Jamahirnyah and the PDRY (People'.s Democratic Republic  
of Yemen -South Yemen) have decided to join this front, making it  
the nucleus a pan-Arab front for steadfastness and combat which  
will be open to other Arab countries to join.” 
This rhetoric may have overstated its true degree of success. The last sentence of 
the document praises “Palestinian unity within the framework of the PLO”. This belies 
the contentious nature of relationships between Palestinian armed groups in this period. 
Supply side factors and internal constraints proved more salient to Palestinian groups’ 
                                                          
54 Emphasis mine  
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efforts to gain support in this period than demand-side factors. Even so, I found evidence 
of SEA, providing support for my first hypothesis. 
 
4.7d: Assessment of Results 
 Fewer data were available on the PFLP’s diplomatic efforts between 1967-1982. 
This issue of missing data, along with supply-side and institutional factors that limited the 
PFLP’s diplomatic capacity, confounded my hypothesis testing. Even so, I observed the 
following.  
 Of the major powers listed, the PFLP lobbied the Soviet Union and China. Of 
these two states, China proved to be a more reliable source of support and a greater 
ideological influence. This relationship shows signs of endogeneity and a potential for 
reverse causality, however.  
 Of the Arab states listed, the PFLP lobbied Algeria, Libya, and Syria55. These 
states are conceived of in scholarly literature as being more revisionist or radical than 
others in the Arab world such as Egypt (Fawcett 2004). The PFLP’s maximalist, “Arab 
revolution” ideology and appeals thus fit with these states weltanschauungen and 
credibly signaled shared preferences. I thus see support for my first hypothesis. The 
PFLP’s influence among populations was less clear.  
 Muslim states did not figure in to the foreign policy of the secular, leftist PFLP. 
However, they engaged in rebel diplomatic activity with Communist states, such as South 
                                                          
55 As well as South Yemen, which was coded as Communist 
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Yemen, the USSR, and China, seeking legitimization along ideological rather than 
religious lines.   
4.8: Results and Confounding Factors 
 To reiterate, these case studies were intended to test the following hypotheses: 
H1: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's 
population will lobby the state using ethnically-based language 
H2: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of 
a state’s government will lobby the state using ethnically-based language 
Likewise, my variables are as follows: 
IVs: 
A) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s ruling coalition to a rebel group 
B) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s population to a rebel group 
 
DVs: 
A) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts 
B) The usage of ethnic appeals within said efforts 
 
4.9a: Hypotheses 1 & 3 
  
 My government-based hypotheses received mixed support. While Fatah and the 
PFLP were more likely to lobby Arab governments than the majority of great powers and 
Muslim states, their propensity to lobby Communist states confounds my assertion.  
4.9b: Hypotheses 2 &4 
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 My population-based hypotheses likewise received mixed support. There was a 
high level of covariance between all of my hypotheses: states that had a government 
coalition of a given ethnicity tended to have a majority population of the same ethnic 
group. Likewise, , there is no clear evidence of indirect lobbying in the cases of Fatah or 
the PFLP.  Graphically, the results of this analysis can be depicted as follows: 
Group Name 1967-1972 1972-1977 1977-1982 
Fatah SEA , Non-Ethnic 
Framing56 
No clear results      SEA, Non-
Ethnic Framing        
PFLP SEA, Non-Ethnic 
Framing 
No SEA SEA, Non-Ethnic 
Framing 
 
 When compared with Kirisci’s (1986) conceptualizations of support for the PLO 
as a multi-step function or as occurring across levels, PLO rebel diplomacy did not 
directly mirror either of these propositions. Palestinian groups lobbied actors from many 
of these levels simultaneously rather than working their way up an arbitrary “ladder” of 
relevancy. The theoretical processes that Kirisci describes appear to have been better at 
explaining the behavior of the actors that were lobbied by the PLO rather than the PLO 
actors who chose to lobby them in the first place.  
Evidence of “indirect lobbying” via populations within states, though empirically 
supported, could not be clearly found. Though some literature (Hanafi and Long 2010) 
suggests that PLO militants and workers in the camps helped promote a sense of 
                                                          
56 Such framing as ideological, religious or other framing strategies, e.g. framing conflict in leftist terms 
when lobbying Communist states 
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Palestinian identity in exile, usage of SEA to influence state policy via refugee 
populations can only be inferred.   
4.9c: Confounding Factors 
 One possible reason that we failed to see the expected level of ethnically-based 
appeals in these case studies is because of the time period selected. Factors such as the 
1961 collapse of the United Arab Republic, the defeat of Arab armies in 1967, and the 
death of Gamal Abd El Nasser in 1970 weakened the influence of Arabism among 
Palestinians. If I were to change the period of analysis to include the 1950s and early 
1960s, more SEA would likely have occurred. However, less rebel diplomacy may have 
occurred as well: Palestinian groups were almost wholly subordinated to external 
(primarily Egyptian) leadership in this period (Kirisci 1986). 
International rivalries also confounded this relationship. Delegation to Palestinian 
armed groups as a form of “war by other means” against Israel was one of the driving 
factors behind Arab states’ behavior and may have even had greater salience than ethnic 
linkages at times. After the 1948 war, Arab states allowed Fedayeen to conduct reprisal 
raids from their territory and consistently provided arms and support throughout the mid-
20th century. Signals of military success also were influential. For example, the successes 
of the raids on Kiryat Shmona  and Ma’alot in the early 1970s by the PFLP-GC served as 
a costly signal of their resolve and won them additional support from the Libyan and 
Iraqi regimes.  
The internal political dynamics of Arab states had a strong, if uneven confounding 
effect In the years after 1948, these states attempted to confound Palestinian refugees’ 
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efforts to organize politically within their borders: in 1949, for example, Jordan banned 
Palestinian social organizations from political activity and, fearing secessionism, 
Egyptian authorities cracked down on Palestinian Ba’athists and Islamists in Gaza during 
the 1950s.The security fears of Arab regimes, as previously evinced,  drove some 
Palestinian groups to alter their diplomatic efforts. Fatah, arguably the largest and most 
influential of the PLO’s factions, had to engage in framing that presented itself a 
legitimate supporter of Arab nationalist ideals, yet within a distinctly Palestinian 
framework; after 1969, it referred to “the liberation of Palestine” rather than  “ending 
Israeli occupation” (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973). A statement from Fateh 
spokesman Hani Al-Hassan notes: “We in Fatah have learned that the Arab nation will 
not embark on the course of struggle and cannot change its conditions unless it practices 
revolutionary mutiny…Revolutionary struggle as we view it is the only way for the 
recreation of the Arab nation, the reformation of its soul, and the reactivation of the Arab 
masses”. Thus, it can be seen that groups like Fatah still appealed to broader Arab 
nationalism even while they sought more limited objectives. Likewise, the PLO is 
something of a unique case among rebel movements, as it was created in a 1964 meeting 
of the Arab League as a “Potemkin village” controlled by Arab states (Barnett, 1998). 
This was rooted in concern over costs from supporting Palestinian actions against Israel: 
the creation and backing of the PLO was an endeavor far less costly than direct military 
engagement. The high level of external penetration by Arab states from the very outset 
,ay have a strong impact on the results we saw.  
The internal dynamics of the Palestinian national movement also greatly 
influenced how and from whom its constituent groups sought support. Particularly after 
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the “Black September” conflict of 1970 , they Yom Kippur War, and the PLO’s Ten 
Point Program (which was perceived by hardliners as limiting the liberation of 
Palestinian territory) divisions between the Marxist, qawmiyya-oriented factions and 
more mainstream nationalists like Fatah were exacerbated, which ultimately led to the 
creation of the Rejectionist Front in 1974. The constituent factions of the Front, the 
largest of which was the PFLP, pursued an independent diplomatic agenda targeted at 
revisionist Arab states like Libya and Syria. As Pearlman (2014) notes, analyzing the 
Palestinian national movement as a singular entity is a difficult, if not fruitless endeavor, 
due to the number of discrete factions within it with often divergent motives.  
Differing ideological currents within the PLO made its internal politics 
continuously contentious. Pan-Arab qawmiyya and Palestinian wataniyya clashed, and 
the Marxist views of groups such as the PFLP and DFLP made Arafat’s decision-making 
hard to enforce despite his efforts to present the PLO  as a unified force (Rubin  1994). 
Smaller factions within the PLO, such as the previously surveyed Ba’athist groups, also 
confounded Arafat’s vision.  
Another confounding factor is outside influence in the PLO’s constituent factions. 
As previously detailed, George Habash was recruited by the KGB as an asset. Extant 
literature notes that this not an uncommon process. Huang (Forthcoming)) notes that 
states can use the offer of diplomatic engagement to influence the behavior of rebel 
groups. In his study of militant groups in Kashmir, Staniland (2014) notes that the pre-
existing weaknesses of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) provided 
opportunities for penetration and interference by both Pakistan and India. In the case of 
the PLO, different Arab states founded and backed proxy factions within the movement. 
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Seeking to create a Ba’athist alternative to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, the Syrian government 
created as-Sa’iqa (“the thunderbolt”) in 1966. Iraq followed a similar course of action 
three years later with the creation of the Arab Liberation Front. Though officially a part 
of the PLO, Sa’iqa was forced to fight against other constituent factions of the movement 
during the Lebanese Civil War. This group, clearly a tool of the Syrian government for 
enacting its interests, is a clear example of state exploitation of a rebel movement. Thus, 
if we are to judge the PLO as a whole, it does not meet any of the aforementioned 
categories.  
The strategic employment of ideological, rather than ethnic framing also 
confounds this relationship. This can be seen in the DFLP (then PDFLP)’s rebel 
diplomatic efforts with the Soviet Union. This group framed itself in Marxist terms and 
“Strove to assert itself as the principal Soviet ally within the PLO” (Sayigh, 1997).  This 
form of framing was strategically employed in the 1960s, and sought to play into Soviet 
third-worldist” foreign policy.  The assertion that rebel groups can draw upon multiple 
frames of reference is substantiated in multiple bodies of literature and is demonstrated 
multiple times in this thesis’ case studies.  
The time period analyzed may have influenced my results. The defeat of Arab 
armies in 1967 significantly affected the salience of Pan-Arab ideology to the PLO’s 
constituent factions, which likely had a significant effect on their usage of language 
invoking Arab identities-or lack thereof. Even so, the autonomy of said groups grew 
during this time period, due in part to the fact that until 1967 Gamal Abd El Nasser (who 
was largely responsible for the PLO’s actions during its earliest years) had placed 
stringent restrictions on Palestinian political activity (Cobban 1984). 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to contribute to the filling of a theoretical lacuna by asking: 
“what role do ethnic ties play in rebel groups’ efforts to lobby for state support?” In it, I 
reframed Salehyan et. al (2011) and Saideman (2002)’s logic to address the demand side 
of the state-armed group relationship, positing that ethnicity can be used as a “screening 
device” by rebel groups as well as states. I hypothesized that rebel groups that share an 
ethnic tie with the majority of a state’s ruling coalition and/or population are more likely 
to lobby them for support. I also maintain that said lobbying will strategically invoke 
shared ethnic ties and historical memories, framing appeals in “ethnic terms”. I found that 
such framing was used, though in conjunction with others, including the invocation of 
ideological frames. This work’s contribution and aim is to start a broader conversation on 
the role of the “demand side” in state support and framing processes in rebel diplomacy 
This work is only the first to be written on the subject of Statetegic Ethnic 
Affectation. Thus, there is substantial room for future research on this topic. First, there is 
an opportunity to continue to elucidate the role of ethnicity in rebels’ transnational 
political activities. Both this work and Asal et. al (2014) provide a solid foundation for 
such endeavors, yet several important questions remain unanswered. Do ethnic linkages 
change the amount of support that groups receive or the nature (financial, material, 
military) that they receive? Likewise, do rebel groups employ different frames when 
seeking material goals and others when they seek normative goals? Most importantly, f-
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urther studies can test the assertions of my theory and determine whether or not my 
results are replicable.  
This work intends to start a scholarly conversation on a topic of deep salience to 
both the academic study of conflict and the efforts of policymakers to contain it. As civil 
wars in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, and other states continue, research on rebel behavior will 
continue to be of vital importance to those who seek to discover the processes at work 
when rebels turn their eyes to the outside world.  
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